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1. In t ernet Sym posium: Legal Potholes Along the Information Su perhighway,
16 LOY. L.A.  E N T . L.J . 541, 601 (1995 ) (stat eme nt  of John  Bar low). 
2. S ee ACLU v. Ren o, 929 F. S upp . 824, 831 (E .D. Pa . 1996), aff ’d ,  521  U .S.
844 (199 7) (ad dr es sin g a  cons ti tu ti ona l ch al len ge t o th e Com mu ni cat ion s De cen cy Act
of 1996; the d is t rict  cour t d oes  not  give  an y sou rce  for t he  nu me ri cal  figu re s wh ich
it  provides ). Some exper ts h ave pr edicted t ha t by 2005 t he n um ber of people
connected to t he I n ter net  may r ea ch  on e b il lion ! S ee SECR ETAR IAT  O N  E LECT R O N IC
COMMERCE , U.S. DE P ’T  O F  COMMERCE , TH E  E MERGING DIGITAL E C O N O M Y 7 (1998). 
3. S ee A C L U, 929 F. Supp. at  831.
4. S ee id .
5. S ee id .
6. S ee SECR ETAR IAT  O N  E LECTRONIC COMMERC E , U.S. DE P ’T  O F  COMMERCE , TH E
E M E R G I N G DIGITAL E C O N O M Y 2 (19 98).
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www.in ter na t iona l_shoe.com: Ana lyzing Weber v.
J olly Hotels’ Pa rad igm for  Persona l 
J urisdiction in Cyberspace
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
The un pr eceden ted  explosion of th e In ter net  ha s sin gula rly
indu ced “the  mos t  p rofoun d t rans format ion  a  t echnology has
br ough t  sin ce th e cap tu re  of fire .”1 A review of th e expone nt ial
growth  sur rounding  the In t erne t  r evea l s some dizzying figures.
In  1981 le ss  t han  300 com pu ter s w er e con nect ed  to the
In terne t .2 Eigh t  year s later  th e num ber ha d only grown to
about  90,000.3 But by 1996 an estimated 9,000,000 comput e rs
worldwide were link ed to th e Int ern et. 4 The mos t  s t agger ing
figur e of all, however, is th e estim at ed 200,000,000 comput ers
which  wil l be  tapp ed  in to t h is  r emarkable  globa l m in e of
in forma t ion  by the yea r 1999.5 Recen t ly,  t r a ffic on  th e Int ern et
has been doubling every 100 days.6
Such  exp ansive g rowt h  has cr ea ted  sign ifica n t  ramifica t ion s
in  the le ga l fie ld . Am ong t he h ot t es t  lega l is su es  to r oll off t he
in forma t ion  su per high wa y is th e qu es t ion  of pe rson a l, or
t e r ritor ial,  ju r isdict ion  over  In ter net  use r s.  Dis t r ict  cour t s
across the  coun t ry a re being  in unda ted  wit h  case s in  wh ich
pla int iffs s eek  to use In ter net -rela ted  act ivi ty a s a  ba si s for
persona l jurisdiction. Natur ally, Internet users a re “entitled to
the [fu ll] p rotect ion  of the Due P roces s C la use , wh ich  ma nda tes
tha t  potent ial defenda nt s be a b le  t o ‘s t ructu re  the ir  p r imary
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7. CompuServe,  Inc. v. P at ter son, 89  F.3 d 1257, 1262 (6th  Cir. 1996) (quot ing
World-Wide Volk sw ag en  Cor p. v . Wood son , 44 4 U .S.  286 , 29 7 (19 80)).
8. Ann  Davis , T an gled  Web: H ow t he N et B ecam e La nd  of Op port un ity  for
Legal  Profession , WALL ST . J ., Oct. 13, 1997, at A1.
9. Id . 
10. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,  952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123  (W.D. Pa .
199 7).
11. Dell Comput ers r eported online s ales rea ching $6,000,000 per  day  in
December of 1997. Another  online mar ketplace, Auto-by-Tel, report ed $1,800,000,000
in  au to sa les in  1996. By t he e nd of Novem ber  1997, h owever , i t s s a le s  h ad jumped
to $500,000,000  a  m ont h, or  $6,000,00 0,000 a nn ua lized. S ee SECRETARIAT ON
E LECTRONIC  COMMERCE , U.S. DE P ’T  O F  COMMERCE , TH E  E MERGING DIGITAL E C O N O M Y
conduct  wit h  som e min imum assurance  as to where  the conduct
will a nd  will n ot r en der  th em  liab le t o suit .’”7
As recen t ly obse rved  in  a Wall St reet  J ourn al ar ticle,
however, I n t ern et u ser s a re fin din g th at  th is r ight  is bein g
tr am pled on. The article notes that  severa l years a go “th e Net’s
freew he elin g, new-frontier style” made it “the kind of pla ce
where en t repreneurs cou ld make  de a ls, laun ch products and
gr ow with  a  min imum of headaches .”8 But  with  th e ris e in
lit iga t ion  over cyberspace, “[t ]he  fea r  of l awsu it s  is  tu rn ing  the
World Wide Web into a world of war n ings.”9 This pr oblem
high light s the vital n eed of Int ern et u sers  to know when  an d
where th eir I nt ern et a ctivitie s will  ren der  them  liable to suit. Is
mer ely pla cing an  inform at iona l web page on th e Int ern et
suffi cien t  t o es t abli sh  pe rson a l ju r isdict ion ? Wh at  abou t
crea t ing a we b sit e wh ich solicits bu sin ess and  a llows user s
in te ract ively to exchange in format ion? And  how should the
ju r isdict ion a l issu e be r esolved in  th e case  of a per son a ctively
conduct ing  bus iness  over  t he  In t e rnet?
Fu rt her  complica t ing the  answers  to these  quest ions  is  the
fact  tha t  cyber -ju r i sd ict ion  cases  ra rely involve Int ern et
con tact s alone. Typically in t hes e case s t he d efend an t comm its
a ct s and ma kes conta cts in ad dition  t o t hose made v ia  t he
In terne t . How s hould  thes e a dd it ion a l con tacts be  factored into
the ju r isdict ion a l eq ua t ion ? Th us fa r , t he “developm en t  of th e
law concern ing t he p erm issible s cope of per sona l jur isdiction
based  on In te rn et  us e is in  its  infa nt  st age s.”10 Th e d ecis ion s
rea ched by the court s in r esponse t o such  ques t ions  wil l thus
have a  p r ofound impa ct  on t he con t in ued  developm en t  of th e
In ter net —par ticu la r ly th e bu rgeon ing fina ncia l act ivity bein g
t r ansacted the re11—eith er b y imp edin g or by foster ing it .
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2 (1998). 
12. S ee Weber  v. J olly Hote ls, 977 F . Sup p. 327 (D.N .J . 1997). I t shou ld be
noted  tha t th e “Web er mod el” is  al mos t i den ti ca l to a model proposed  ear lier by a
federa l dist rict  court  in P enn sylvan ia. S ee Zi ppo M fg. Co., 952 F. Supp. a t 1119.
Because the Web er model is so closely patt erned a fter the Zippo model, the Zippo
cour t  lik ely s hou ld b e giv en  cre dit  for d eve lopi ng  th e s che me  wh ich  is t he  su bject  of
th is Note . 
13. Persona l jur isd icti on s hou ld n ot  be confused  with  su bject -ma tt er  jur isd icti on.
“Subje c t -ma t t e r jur isd icti on d efin es t he  cour t’s au th orit y to h ea r a  give n t ype  of case,
A Septem ber 1997 decis ion  of the U nit ed  St a tes  Dis t r ict
Cou r t  for  the Dis t r ict  of New J er sey, Weber v. Jolly Hotels,
developed an  analytica l model for a ddr essin g cases  involving
cybe r -ju r isdict ion .12 It  pr opos ed  a  th ree-t ier ed  cla ss ifica t ion
based  upon a qualitative analysis of a defendant ’s con tact s
made  over the In ter net . This Note exa m ines Weber and
concludes  tha t  for  t he  mos t  p a rt t he court  corr ectly interp ret ed
and applied In ternat iona l Shoe and  it s  p rogeny  in  adop t ing  the
th ree-tiered  mode l. However, th e Weber s cheme i s an
inadequa te yardst ick  for deter min ing pe rs ona l jur isdict ion in
cyberspace. Althou gh t he Web er m odel pr ovides som e he lp in
an alyzin g th e jur isdictiona l quest ion, by itself it is incomplete
a nd fa ils  to pr ovid e s ufficie n t ly d et a ile d cr it er ia  to ena ble a
cour t  applying it t o distinguish  between  th e differin g types and
th e var ying degrees  of cybe r -contact s.
Pa r t  II of this Note discusses the backdrop of t he  pe rsona l
ju r isdict ion  fra mew ork aga in st  wh ich  the is su es  of cybe rsp ace
ju r isdict ion  mus t  be  resolved.  Par t I I I summar izes  the fact s  and
the cour t ’s  r eason ing in  Weber.  Pa r t  IV exam ines  th e Weber
cour t ’s ju r isdiction al a na lysis in  dept h a nd  as sess es wh eth er it
conforms wit h t he  pr e-exist ing In ternat iona l Shoe fram ework.
After  r e comm end ing a  nu mbe r of sub st an tia l modificat ions in
Pa r t  V, th is N ote conclu des  th at  for re as ons of pu blic policy an d
fundamenta l fa ir nes s,  cour t s s hould  adop t  a  cyber-jur isdict ion
pa ra digm  resembling this revamped and bolst ered Weber
scheme.
II. BA CK G R OU N D
A. Th e Tradit ional Personal J urisd iction Fram ework:
In terna t iona l  Shoe
 Persona l ju r isdict ion  con ce r n s t h e  a ut h or ity of a  cour t  t o
subject a  pe r son  to bin ding a dju dica t ion .13 More s pecifically,
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wher e a s per sonal jurisdiction protects the individua l interest  tha t is implicated when
a  nonres iden t  de fendan t is ha led int o a dist an t a nd p ossibly in conven ient  forum .”
United  St at es  v. M or ton , 46 7 U .S.  822 , 82 8 (19 84).
14. S ee Ku lko v . Su per ior C our t, 4 36 U .S. 8 4, 91  (1978 ); McGee  v. In te rn at iona l
Life  Ins . Co., 355 U.S . 220, 222 (1957 ). 
15. In t e rna tio n a l S h oe Co. v. W as hin gton , 326  U.S . 310 , 319  (1945 ); see also
World-Wide Volks wa gen  Cor p. v. W oodson , 444 U.S . 286, 291 (1980) (holding t ha t a
“judgmen t  ren dere d in violat ion of due pr ocess is void in the ren derin g Sta te a nd is
no t en ti tl ed  to fu ll fa it h a nd  cre dit  els ew he re ”).
16. World -Wide Vol ks wa gen , 444 U.S. at 297.
17. Id . at 292.
18. When  a s ta te e xer cises p ers ona l jur isdiction over  a defen dan t in  a su it
a r i sing out of or r elat ed to t he de fenda nt ’s conta cts wit h  th e forum , th e sta te is
exe rci sing specific jur isdiction . S ee Arthur  T. von Mehren  & Donald T . T r au tman ,
J ur isd icti on  to Adjud icate: A S uggested Analysis , 79 HARV. L. RE V. 1121, 1144-64
persona l ju r isdict ion  is  the ge ogr aph ica l limi ta t ion  tha t
r e st r ict s wher e a defenda nt  ma y be sued  over a pa r t icu la r
ma t t e r .14 The  not ion of per sona l, or t err itor ial, jur isdict ion is a
concept  gene ra lly int uit ive t o th e a ver age American : A citizen
ha ppily res idin g in Wiscons in  justly would be d is tu rbed to l ea rn
tha t  he was b ein g h a led  in to a  Wyom in g cou r t  if h e ha d n o prior
con tact  with t he st at e of Wyoming. This would n either  be fair
nor r easona ble.
Not  sur prisin gly, th en, th e Supr eme Cour t  has  sa id  tha t the
Due Process Clause of the  Fou r teenth Amendment  shields a
person from a  bind ing  judgm ent  in a  foreign ju ris diction w ith
which  he  has n o me an ingfu l “conta cts, t ies, or  re lat ions.”15 The
purpose of this ju r isdict iona l res tr iction is t wofold. Fir st , it is
inten ded to prevent a plaintiff from suing a defendant  in  a
foreign  jurisdiction unless th e defenda nt  has e st abli sh ed  som e
re la t ionsh ip with  tha t  forum tha t  would le a d h im to
“reasonably  an ticipate” being sued t her e.16 Second, it a ssu res
tha t  the st a te cou r t s “do n ot  rea ch  beyon d the limit s impos ed  on
th em by their  sta tu s as coequal sovereigns in  a federa l
syst em .”17 While  an  exha us tive , in-dep th  t rea tment  of persona l
ju r isdict ion  lies bey on d  t h e scope of this N ote, t he following
overview is  necess a ry in  orde r  to eva lu a te h ow cyb er sp ace
ju r isdict ion  fit s in to the p re-exis t in g fr amework.
1. Gen era l v ersus speci fi c ju ri sd ict ion
 Genera l and sp ecific jur isdiction are t wo theories  un der
which  a cour t ca n a sser t p ers ona l ju r isdiction over a
nonresiden t  defendan t .18 In  discu ssin g gener al a nd  specific
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(196 6).  When a stat e exercises pe r s on a l  ju r isd icti on ove r a  defe nd an t in  a s uit  not
a r i sing ou t  of or relat ed to th e defend an t’s cont acts  with  th e forum , th e sta te is
exe rci sing gene ral jur isdiction . S ee Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786-87 (1984); Lea
Br ilmayer , How  Con ta cts  Cou nt : Due P rocess L im ita tion s on  S tat e Cou rt J ur isd icti on ,
1980 SU P . CT . RE V. 77, 80-81; von Me hr en & T ra ut ma n, supra , at 1136-44.
19. He licopt er os Na cionale s de Colom bia, S .A. v. Hall, 466 U.S . 408, 414-16
(198 4).  
20. S ee id.; see also, e.g., WILLI AM  M. RI C H M AN  & WI L L I AM  L. REYNOLDS ,
U N D E R S T AN D I N G CO N F L IC T  OF  LA W S  § 25(A),  a t  56 (1984) ( expla in ing tha t  as  t he
quan t ity of a d efendan t’s cont act s wi th  th e for um  incr ea ses , a l ess er  conn ect ion
between  th e cau se of action  an d th e forum  is ne eded ). 
21. Th is so-called “center  of busines s context ” was apt ly describe d by th e
S u p re m e Cou rt  as  follows: “[T]h er e h ave  bee n in st an ces i n w hich  th e con tin uou s
corp ora te  operations within a sta te were thought so substan tia l and  of  such  a na tu re
as to j us ti fy su it  ag ai ns t i t on  cau se s of a ct i on  a r isi ng  from  dea lin gs e nt ir ely d ist in ct
from  those  act ivit ies .” In te rn at ion al  Sh oe C o. v. W as hi ng ton , 32 6 U .S.  310 , 31 8 (19 45);
see also Perk ins v. Benguet  Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-49 (1952) (holding
tha t  an Oh io court could exercise jur isdiction over a corporation wh o se  op e r ations  in
Ohio wer e con ti nu ous  an d s yst em at ic, ev en  “whe re  th e ca us e of act ion a ros e fr om
activities en ti re ly d ist in ct fr om  it s a cti vit ies  in  Oh io”).
22. S ee d iscuss ion  infra  Par t II.A.3.
23. S ee Reynolds  v.  In terna t io n a l A m a teur Ath letic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1116
(6th  Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[t]he cause of action must  arise from th e defendan t ’s
activities” with th e forum  stat e); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patter son, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263
ju r isdict ion , it sh ould be rem ember e d t ha t  t he  two theor i es  a re
not  d iscre te and  unrela ted; rat her , they r epres ent  differen t
poin t s a lon g a  cont in uous ju r isdict ion a l spe ct rum.
a. General ju ri sd ict ion . The Supreme Cour t  has  sa id  tha t
genera l jurisdiction exists only when  a  defendan t ’s  con tact s
wit h  th e foru m s ta te  ar e “cont inu ous a nd  syst em at ic.”19 Und er
these ci r cums tances,  a defendan t  fa i rly may be r equ i red to
litiga te  any d ispu te  in  the cou r t s of the forum  stat e, regardless
of whe th er or  not  th e pa rt icular  dispute ar ises out of those
conta cts.20 For  exam ple, a  corpora t ion  may be sued  a t  it s
corpora te hea dquart ers even if the forum stat e has no
re la t ionsh ip  wi th the  cl a im.21
b. S pecific ju ri sd ict ion . Sp ecifi c ju r isdict ion , by  cont rast ,
ar ises ou t  of a  pa r t icu l ar  s et  of con tact s ma de with  the  forum
sta te.  When ge n era l jur isdict ion does n ot exist , specific
ju r isdict ion  a llows a cour t t o exercise pers onal jurisd iction over
a  nonresident  defendan t for foru m-relat ed activities wh ere t he
re la t ionsh ip between  the defendan t , the forum , and the cause of
act ion  sa t is fi es  t he “min i mu m  con tact s” t e st .22 I n  order  t o
s a t isfy specific jur isdiction requir emen ts, t he su it mu st be
su fficient ly relat ed  t o t h e con tact s  made  wi th the  st a t e .23 In
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(6th  Cir. 19 96). 
24. S ee, e.g., RICH MAN  & REYNOLDS , supra  note 20, § 25(A), at 56.
25. S ee B u r n ham  v. Sup erior  Cour t, 495  U.S. 60 4, 639 n .14 (1990) (Bren na n, J .,
concur r ing ) (discussin g Ju stice Sca lia’s opinion th at  sta tes m ay en act lon g ar m
s ta tu t es wh ich e xte nd  th e r ea ch of t he ir  per son al j ur isd icti on t o th e lim its  set  fort h
by th e U .S.  Con st it ut ion ).
26. Lon g ar m st at ut es ar e “[v]arious  sta te legisla tive  acts  wh ich p rov ide  for
persona l jurisdicti on, v ia s ub st itu te d se rv ice of pr ocess , over  per son s or  corp ora tion s
wh ich  are nonresidents of the state and which voluntarily go into the sta t e, direct ly
or  by agent, or communicate with persons i n  t he sta te, for lim ited p ur poses, in
ac tions which concern claims r elating to th e perfor mance or execution of those
purposes  . . . .” BLACK’S  LAW DICTIONARY 942  (6t h e d. 1 990 ).
27. Arkansas’ long arm st atu te, for example, is representative of most states’
long  arm st atutes: “The courts of this state shall have person a l  ju r isdiction of all
persons, and a ll causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximu m extent
permit ted  by t he  du e p ro ces s of la w cla us e of t he  Fo ur te en th  Ame nd me nt  of th e
United  Sta tes  Const itu tion .” ARK . CO D E  AN N . § 16-4 -101 (B) (Mi chi e S up p. 1 997 ).
28. S ee F E D . R. CIV. P . 4(e).
gener al,  the more systematic and continuous the defendant’s
con tact s wit h  the for um, t he le ss  rela ted  to the s u it  the con tact s
mu st be. 24
2. Determin ing when personal jurisdiction is appropriate
 In  det e rminin g whe th er it  may properly exercise persona l
ju r isdict ion  over an out-of-stat e defendant , a court must  decide
two sepa ra t e i ssues : fi r st , w h et he r  t he forum s t a t e’s  long a rm
s ta tu t e a l lows  ju r i sd ict ion ; and s econ d,  wh et her  ju r isdict ion  can
be ma inta ined with out violating constitu tional du e process
requirements.
The Due P rocess Clause of the  Four teen th  Amendment
defines t he  ou te r  limit s  of a  s t ate’s power  to exe rcise p er son a l
ju r isdict ion .25 Each  sta te ’s legis lat ur e is fr ee, h owever , to
re st r ict  persona l jurisdiction even m ore  than  does  the  Due
Process Claus e th rough it s long arm  sta tu te. 26 Typically,
however, a  s t a t e’s  long a rm st a tu te p er mit s e xer cise of per son a l
ju r isdict ion  to the full extent a llowed by the Due Process Clause
of the  Four t een th  Amendmen t .27 Rule  4(e) of th e Feder al Rules
of Civil Pr ocedur e provides th at  feder a l  di st r i ct  cour t s  may
exercise per sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant s to
the exte nt  allowed  by th e long  a rm sta tu te  of the st at e in w hich
the cou r t  sits.28 Cons equ en tly, a s a  pr act ical m at te r, t he
ma jor i ty of cour t s  in  t he  Un i ted S ta t es  may ex er cise  persona l
ju r isdict ion  to the fu ll ext en t  of du e p roces s l im it a t ion s.
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29. In te rna t iona l Shoe  Co.  v.  Washin gton , 326 U.S. 310, 31 6 (1945) (quoting
Milliken  v. Meyer , 311 U.S . 457, 463 (1940 )). 
30. S ee generally Bur ger K ing Cor p. v. Rud zewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-
Wide Volk sw ag en  v. Wo ods on , 44 4 U .S.  286  (198 0).
31. S ee, e.g., Burnham v.  Supe r ior Cour t, 495 U .S. 604, 609 (1990) (citing
International Shoe as t he “class ic expre ssion  of [due pr ocess] crit erion ”). 
32. S ee Ha nson  v. Den ckla, 35 7 U.S. 2 35, 253 (1958). 
33. S ee Keeton v. Hu stler Ma gazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (holding tha t
where defendant h as “deliberately” engaged in significant activity within a st a t e , t he
exercise of person al ju risd iction is  app ropr iat e). 
34. McGee v . In t e rnat ional Life Ins. Co., 355 U .S. 220, 223 (1957) (notin g th at
so long as it creates a  “substantia l connection” with the forum, even a  single ac t  can
suppor t ju ri sd ict ion ).
35. Bu rger  K ing, 471 U.S. at 475-76.
36. Id . at  475 (citing Keeton , 465 U.S . at  774). 
3. The U.S .  Supreme  Cour t’s  “min imum con tact s” ana lysi s: the
three-pronged test
 In  International Shoe Co. v. Washington,  the  Supreme Cou r t
ar ticulat ed th e followin g s tanda rd for  exe rcis in g per son a l
ju r isdict ion : “[D]ue  process requ ires only th at  in order  to
subject a  defendan t  t o a  judgment  . .  . he  must  have ce r ta in
min imum contact s w it h  [the s t a te] s uch  tha t  the m ain ten ance
of the s u it  doe s n ot  offen d ‘tr adi t ion a l n ot ion s of fa ir p lay a nd
su bst an tia l jus tice.’”29
Over fifty years have now passe d s in ce the Court  first
ar ticulat ed this “minimum contacts” test . Alth ough  the  Cour t
h a s subsequ ent ly refined it to some degree, 30 th e min imu m
con tact s t e st  r em a i n s the touchstone of due process.31 Whether
or  not  a  defendan t  has  incur red the  necessa ry  min imum
con tact s is  de ter min ed  by a  th ree-pr onged  tes t : (a) p urposeful
availment, (b) relatedness, and (c) reasonableness.
a. Purposefu l avai lment. The fi r st  p rong  of the  min imum
con tact s test examines whether th e nonresident defendant ha s
purposefully availed  itself of th e pr ot ect ion s a nd ben efit s of t he
laws of th e forum st at e.32 Accordingly, cou r t s look for  an
element  of deliberateness 33 i n  whe ther  the  de fendan t  has
crea ted  a  “su bs tan t ia l con nect ion ”34 or  “cont in u in g obl iga t ion s”3 5  w t h
residen t s of the for um s ta te. Th e pu rp oseful a vailm ent  inqu iry
ensu res  tha t  “r andom,” “for tu itous ,” or  “a t t enua ted” con tact s do
not  cau se a  defen da nt  to be im pr operly h aled  int o a  forum.36
For  thes e r ea son s,  “it i s e ss en t ia l in  ea ch  cas e t h a t  ther e be
some act  by w hich  the d efenda nt  pu rpos efu lly  ava ils  it se lf of
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37. Ha ns on , 357 U.S. at 253.
38. CompuServe,  Inc. v. Patt erson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th  Cir. 1996) (quotin g
Reynolds v. I n t e r n a tion al  Ama te ur  Ath let ic F ed ’n, 23  F. 3d  111 0, 1 116  (6t h C ir . 19 94)).
39. S ee, e.g., RICH MAN  & REYNOLDS , supra  note 20, § 25(A), at 56.
40. In te rna t iona l Shoe Co. v. Was hin gton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quot ing
Milliken  v. Meyer , 311 U.S . 457, 463 (1940 )). 
41. World-Wide Volkswagen  Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The
S u p re m e Court ha s identified five factors to be weighed in deter mining whet her t he
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable:
1. the bu rden  p laced  on  the  defendan t ;
2. the foru m s ta te ’s in te re st  in a dju dica tin g th e di spu te  by pr ovidin g a for um ;
3. the pla in ti ff ’s int er es t i n o bt ai ni ng  con ven ien t a nd  effe cti ve r eli ef;
4. the interst ate judicial system’s inter est in obtainin g the most efficient
re solu tion  of controversies;
5. the sh ar ed i nt er est  of the severa l states  in fur th erin g funda men ta l subs ta nt ive
social policies.
S ee id . at 292. Further, “[t]hese considerations sometimes serve  to  es t ab li sh  the
reasonableness of jurisdiction  upon  a less er s howing of min im um  conta cts t ha n would
otherwise be re quir ed.” Burger K ing, 471 U.S . at  477. 
the privilege of conductin g activit ies wit hin  th e foru m S ta te .”37
The heart  of th e pu rp oseful a vailm ent  an alys is t hu s lies in
dete rmin ing precisely what a ctivities the defendan t  e n gaged in
th at  were dir ected towar d th e foru m st at e.
b. Relatedn ess. The second prong  of the  min imum
con tact s t e st  examines whether t he  claim  bein g brou ght
“arise[s] from the  de fendan t ’s  act ivities ” with in  the forum
sta te. 38 It  focus es on w het her  th e su it is  su ffi ci en t ly  re la t ed to
the con tact s  be tween  the  forum  s ta te and  the defendan t .  The
degree  of relat edness  requ ired a ppear s to be invers ely
propor t iona l to th e nu m b er  of con tact s  made; tha t  i s,  the
g rea t e r the nu mber and su bsta n t ia lity of the defendant ’s
con tact s with the sta te, the less related th e con tact s mus t  be  to
th e suit  in order  to sat isfy this requ iremen t. 39
c. Reasonablen ess. The third prong of the test focuses on
whet her  th e cour t ’s e xer cise of ju r isdict ion  is  rea son able , so as
not  to offend “‘tra ditional notions of fair play and subst a n t ia l
jus tice.’”4 0  Re a son a bleness  genera l ly  is  sa t i s f ied  by
demons t ra t ing a cer ta in d egr ee of fore se ea bil it y. “[T]h e
foreseea bility  that  is critical to due process analysis . .  . is tha t
the defendant’s conduct  and  connect ion  with  the forum S ta t e
a re such  t h a t  h e sh ould r eas ona bly an ticipa te b eing h aled  int o
cour t  th er e.”41 Th is  requ ir em en t  is  de sign ed  to pr otect  the
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42. World -Wide Vol ks wa gen , 444 U.S. at 292.
43. Hearst  Corp. v. Goldberge r, N o. 96 Ci v. 36 20, 1 997 W L 97 097,  at  *7
(S. D.N. Y. Fe b. 2 6, 1 997 ).
44. S ee, e.g., Da vid R . J ohn son  & Da vid P ost , L a w  an d B ord ers— Th e Ri se of
Law  in  Cyb ersp ace, 48 STAN . L. RE V. 136 7 (19 96) (ad vocating a new legal mechanism
for  cybers pace). But  cf. Hen ry H . Per rit t, J r., J ur isd icti on i n C yber spa ce, 41 VILL . L.
RE V. 1  (1996) ( sugges t ing  tha t  cur ren t  min imum contac t s ana lysis in formed by new
techn ology is a de qu at e for  cybe rs pa ce is su es ).
45. S ee d is cuss ion  supra  Pa rt  II.A.
46. S ee generally Dan  L.  Burk, Ju risdiction in a World Without B orders, 1 VA.
defendan t  “against th e burdens of litiga t ing  in  a  d is t an t  or
inconve nie nt  forum .”42 
B. App licat ion  of the S upr em e Cou rt ’s Personal  J uri sd ict ion
Framework  to the In ternet
While  the Supr eme  Cour t’s per sona l jur isdict ion doctr ine
appea r s r e lat ively str aight forwa rd, a pplying it to novel
scena rios  involving th e Int ern et  has caused some notable head-
scra tch ing in the judicia l r anks.  A dist r ict  cour t  in  Ne w Yor k
frankly noted tha t  “[t]he issue of personal jurisdiction and the
Int ern et  h as sp lit t he  feder al d ist rict  court s t ha t h ave
ad dr ess ed t he  issu e t o dat e.”43
1. Unique challenges faced in applying the personal
ju ri sd ict ion  m odel t o th e In ternet
 T h e un iqu e ph ysica l  characte r is t ics  of the  Int ern et  h a ve
caused i t  t o push  pa in fu l ly  against  t he  ou te r  limit s  of the
Supreme Cou r t ’s ju r isdict ion a l fr amework. Ra is in g bot h
na t iona l and in ter na t ion a l lega l con cerns , cyber-jur isdict ion is
such  a t horn y issue t ha t some com m e n t a t ors  have  gone  so fa r
as to ur ge an ext ra -nat ional legal system  specifically ta ilored
for dispu tes t ra nscendin g jurisdictional border s.44
a. In ternet activity differs significantly from n ormal life
activity. As discu ssed , per sona l jur isdict ion re lat es t o definin g
the geogra ph ical re ach  of a cour t’s jur isdict ion .45 For  even t s
tha t  occur  with in  di scre te and  well -marked s ta te and
in terna t iona l bounda ries, th is dete r m ina tion  is often  rela tively
stra ightforward. But ,  t he  In t e rnet  poses  a  r a re conundrum.
Because  In ter net  commu nica tion s occur in  th e non ter rit oria l,
boundar yless, et her ea l wor ld  of cybe rsp ace, t he n ot ion  of
terr itor ial  or persona l jurisdiction becomes m uch less clear. 46
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J .  L .  &  T E C H .  3 ,  ¶  6  ( S p r i n g  1 9 9 7 )
<htt p://www.studen t.virginia.edu /~vjolt/graph ics/vol1/ vol1_art3.htm l>.
47. S ee ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. S upp . 824, 830 (E .D. Pa . 1996), aff ’d ,  521 U.S.
844 (199 7) (“Th e In te rn et  is n ot a  ph ysica l or t an gible ent i t y,  bu t  r a the r  a  gi an t
ne twork which in ter connects  inn u m e r able smaller groups of linked comput er
networks. It is  th us a  net work  of netw orks .”). 
48. Bradley A. Slut sky, J ur isd icti on ov er Com m erce on t he In t ernet ,  ¶ 5 (last
modified Ju ne 6, 1997) <http://www.kslaw.com/menu/jurisdic.htm l> cited in Dig ita l
Equip. Cor p. v . Alt av ist a T ech ., I nc. , 96 0 F . Su pp . 45 6, 4 62-6 3 (D.  Ma ss . 19 97).
49. S ee Burk, supra  no t e 46,  ¶  14 (observ ing  tha t  by  it s  ve ry na tu re  the
Inter net  is “t ech no logi cal ly in diffe re nt ” to t he  ph ysi cal  loca ti on  of it s u se rs ).
After  all, how is a cour t t o apply rules  focused  on  the t e r r itor ia l
loca t ion  of events  when  no physical ter ritory is involved?47 As
one commentat or astutely observed,
T h e I n t e r n e t  b r ea k s  d o w n ba rr ier s b et we en  ph ysi ca l
ju r i sd i ct ions . When  a  buye r  and  se l le r  consumm ate  a
comm er cial  t r a nsac t ion  th r ough  a  Wor ld  Wide  W e b  s it e , t h e r e
is  no n eed  for th e t ra dit iona l p h y s i ca l  ac t s  t ha t  o ft en
d e te r m in e  w h ich  ju r i s d i ct ion ’s  la w  w ill a p p ly  a n d w h e th e r  th e
buyer  or  selle r w ill be su bject  to p er son al ju ris dict ion in  th e
cour t s  wher e  the  o the r  i s  loca t ed . 48
“Sur fing” th e Int ern et a nd en ter ing into contra cts over t he
Int ern et  a r e not like crossing norm al geograph ic boun dar ies
and conduct ing normal  bus iness  opera t ions . Mos t  In terne t
user s sim ply a re  not  aw ar e of th e geogra ph ica l loca t ion  of th e
other user s with  whom t hey int era ct .49 Those  sur fing the
Int ern et  jump from one  sit e t o anot he r w ith  no r ea l kn owledge
of the  geogra ph ic boun da rie s t he y ma y be cross ing.
For  exa mple, a  mother  i n  California who purchases a
sewing ma chine by simply clicking a  few icons on th e In t ern et
and en ter ing  a credi t  ca rd  numbe r  m a y not realize she has just
ent ered  in to a  cont r a ct  gover ned  by t he la ws  of Mich iga n . If a
d ispu te a rose betw een  th e mot her  an d t he s ewin g ma chin e
ven dor , th e moth er likely would be quite a larm ed to lear n  t ha t
the ven dor  sou ght t o drag her into a Michigan court . In
con t r a s t , a  bu sines sw oman wh o flie s t o Houst on  for  a  week  of
negot ia t ions  and mee tin gs, an d wh o event ua lly sign s a  cont ract
un der  Texa s law , wou ld  lik ely  be fa r  more a wa re of t he
poten t ia l to be haled into a Texas court.  Because of these
sign ifica n t  differences betwee n  cybe rsp ace a nd t he p hys ica l
world, applying traditional personal jurisdict ion  laws to
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50. S ee Ha ns on  v. D en ckl a,  357  U. S. 2 35,  250 -51 (1 958 ) (“As t ech nolog ica l
progress has increa sed the flow of commerce between Sta tes, the n eed for ju ri sdi ction
over non res iden ts h as u nde rgon e a s imila r in crea se.”). 
51. 471 U. S. 4 62,  476  (198 5).
52. S ee id . 
53. Edias Soft wa re  In t’l v. B as is I nt ’l, 947 F . Su pp . 41 3, 4 20 (D . Ar iz. 1 996 ).
Int ern et  u ser s can  cau se pot ent ially u nd esir able  an d u nfa ir
results.
b. Balancing com pet in g ri gh ts  an d  in terest s— dra win g li nes
in  the right places. In  developin g t he In ternat iona l Shoe
framework over the pa st s everal decades ,  t h e Supreme  Cour t
has ma de clear t ha t a s tech n ology increa ses, s o also sh ould t he
abilit y of court s t o exercise  ju r isdict ion .50 The Cour t d eclar ed in
Bu rger King Corp. v. Rud zewicz tha t ,  “i t  is  an  inescapable fact
of modern commercial life that  a substa n t i al  amoun t  of
business is  t r ansa cted  solely  by m ail a nd w ir e com munica t ion s
across stat e lines, thus ob via t in g t he n eed for  ph ys ica l pres en ce
wit h i n a S ta te  in w hich  bus ine ss is  condu cted .”51 Al though  the
Cou r t  was  not  ad dr essin g th e In ter net  at  th e tim e of its  Bu rger
King de cis ion  in  1984, t he Cour t ’s decl a ra t ions  seem to in dica te
tha t  its jur isdictional fram ework sh ould be ada pted  to
tech nologica l advancements su ch as the In t e r net . E ven  if n o
phys ica l borders ar e crossed , a  court  still may exercise
jur isdict ion so long as the defendant pur posefully has ava iled
its elf of the ben efit s a nd p rotect ions of t he la ws  of the for um
sta te. 52
The challenge, t hen, is kn owing just  wha t constit ut es
“pu rposefu l ava ilme nt ” in t he  conte xt of th e In te rn et . In
gra pplin g wit h  th is  di fficu lt is su e, cour ts  ha ve sou ght  to
ba lance the increa sing n eed t o exe rcise t er r it or ia l ju r isdict ion
(due to modern iza t ion ) wit h  the r igh t  of an  ind ividu al t o ut ilize
the In ternet  wit hout  im pr ope r ly bein g h a led  in to a  cour t room
on th e oth e r  s ide of t he  coun t ry.  On  the  one  hand , pa r t ie s
“shou ld not be per mit ted t o take a dvan ta ge of modern
tech nology th rough  an In terne t  Web page  and forum and
sim ult an eously  escape tra ditional notions of jur isdict ion.”53 On
the oth er  ha nd , In te rn et  us er s—even  th ose condu ctin g busin ess
over the In ter net —rem ain  “ent it led  to the p rotect ion  of the  Due
Process Clause, which mandat es that  potential defendant s be
able  ‘to s t ructu re  thei r  pr imary conduct wit h  some min imum
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54. CompuServe,  Inc. v. Patt erson, 89 F.3d  1257, 1262 (6th  Cir. 1996) (quot ing
World-Wide Volkswagen  Corp. v. Woods on, 444 U .S. 286, 297  (1980)). 
55. S ee Burger K ing, 471 U.S. at 472-73.
56. S ee id. at 473-74  (cit in g Ku lk o v. S up er ior  Cou rt , 43 6 U .S.  84,  96 (1 978 )).
57. Zippo Mfg. C o. v. Zip po Dot  Com , In c.,  95 2 F .  Su pp .  1119,  1124 (W.D.  Pa .
199 7); see also Ha ll v. LaRon de, 66 Ca l. Rptr . 2d 399, 402 (Ca l. 1 997 ) (“The speed
and ea se of s uch  [elect ron ic] comm un icat ions  h ave in cre as ed t he  nu mb er  of
t r ansact ions tha t ar e consumma ted without  either pa rty lea ving th e office. Ther e is
no re as on  wh y t he  re qu isi te  mi ni mu m c on ta cts  can no t b e e lect ro ni c.”). 
58. Cybers ell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir . 1997).  It  is n ot
un rea sona ble to posit t ha t t hose pla cing ma ter ials on t he In ter net  ar e gene ra lly
aware tha t it can be seen  by anyone aroun d the world with a ccess to cyberspace.
a s s u r a n ce as t o where t he conduct will an d will not ren der
th em  liab le t o suit .’”54
Allowing  overly broad ju r isdict ion a l power  ba se d on
Int ern et  activities may violate defendant s’ due process r i gh t s,
as well as inhibit the Int e r n et ’s immen se  pot en t ia l for  future
growth—growth  w h ich  will finan cially benefit th e ent ire global
market . Bu t  wh er e s hou ld  the l in e begin ? And wher e sh ould it
end? In  gr app lin g wit h t hi s cybe r -jurisdict ion  di lem ma, some
lower cour t s  have  bough t  in to ques t ionab le  a rgumen t s
ar ticulat ed by those seekin g to broa dly ext en d p er son a l
ju r isdict ion  into cyberspace. While thes e allur ing ar gumen ts
genera lly begin with a  corr ect prem ise, they conta in inh eren t
flaws which lead to undesirable results.
2. Th e argum ent to extend personal jurisdiction into
cyberspa ce
 The a rguments  for  increas ing the jurisdict ion a l r ea ch  over
Int ern et  activity typically are something along these lines:
Whether a  pa r ty purpos efu lly  di rect s i t s a ct ivit ies toward a
forum, especially when der iving benefits from inter sta te
act ivities , has  a lways  been  a  fundamenta l  factor  in  pe rsona l
ju r isdict ion  cases.55  T h er efore, i t  wou ld  be  unfa ir  to a llow
ind ividu als  wh o pu rpos efu lly  en ga ge in  in ter st a te a ct ivi t ies  for
pr ofit to es cape  accountabil it y in  those  foru m s  for  the
p rox ima te consequ ences of th ose a ct i vities.56 “Differen t r esu lts
shou ld not  be reached simply because [th ose activities ar e]
conducted over th e In te rn et .”57 “[B]ecause cyberspace is without
borders  . . . a web site wh ich a dver tis es a  pr oduct  or ser vice is
neces sa rily intended for  use on  a w orld w ide ba sis.”58 Pa rt ies
us ing such  si tes “should  not  be  pe rmit t ed  to take a dvantage of
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59. Edias Soft wa re  In t’l v. B as is I nt ’l, 947 F . Su pp . 41 3, 4 20 (D . Ar iz. 1 996 ).
60. S ee McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL
753991, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (warning th at th is “would evi scera t e  t he
persona l jur isdiction  req uir eme nt  as it  cur ren tly exis ts”). 
61. Cybersell, 130 F .3d at  420 (em pha sis a dded ). 
62. 947 F.  Su pp . 13 28 (E .D.  Mo. 1 996 ).
modern  te chn ology thr ough  an  I n t er net  Web  pa ge a nd for um
and simult aneou sly es cape  t r adi t ion a l not ions of jur isdict ion.”59
Cons equ en tly,  persona l ju ris diction s hou ld be liber ally
extended to cover  con tact s  incu r red v ia  t he  In t e rnet .
While  a t  fir st  blu sh  th is  lin e of logic seems con vincing, a
closer  look  reveals t ha t em bra cing it w ould cre at e deva st at ing
consequences. If per sona l jur isdict ion wer e liber ally g r a nted
mer ely because of Inter net  tra nsmissions, the whole m ea nin g of
te r r itor ia l ju r isdict ion  wou ld be undermined.60 As  the Nin th
Circu it  warned with regard t o the intellectua l property world,
the disa st rou s r esu lt  of exten din g jur isdict ion in t his  fash ion
would  be tha t  “every com plaint  a r i sing ou t  of a ll eged  t r ademark
infringem ent  on  the  In t e rnet  wou ld au tomat ica l ly  re su l t i n
persona l ju r isdict ion  wh er eve r  the p la in t iff ’s  p r incip a l place of
business is locat ed.”61 While the federa l  ci rcu i t  cour t s  have
re cognized tha t  ju ris diction is  ap pr opria te in  cases  of blata nt
comm ercial activity involving th e Int ern et,  they have adopted a
tem pered  approach  to fu r t h er exp an din g jur isdict ion in
cyberspace. Nevert heless, some lower courts  cont inue t o r each
widely divergent  conclusions in their encount ers with these
issues. Two 199 6 d is t r ict  cour t  case s,  one  ar is in g in  Ca lifor n ia
and th e oth er in  Missou ri,  serve as excellent  foils in  illust ra tin g
the disparity among lower court  decisions.
The first  case,  Mar it z,  In c. v . Cy berGold , In c.,62 involved a
Californ ia  corpor a t ion, Cyber Gold, which  set  up  a we b sit e
us ing th e domain  na me “cyber gold.com.” User s visit ing t he s ite
were  encour aged  to a dd t heir  na me t o a m ailin g lis t  i n  order  t o
r eceive informa t ion  abou t  t he corpora t ion ’s  In t e rnet  s erv ices.
Ma rit z, a  Missour i corpor a t ion ,  a ll eged  tha t  use of the
“cybergold” tr ad ema rk  infr inged  on a s imila r t ra dem ar k it
already owned . Mar itz conse que nt ly sough t a  pr elimin ar y
in junct ion  in Mis sour i en join in g Cyb er gold ’s u se  of th e
t rademark. The cour t  held tha t  th e ability of Missouri In ter net
user s to access the Ca lifornia-bas ed compa ny’s web sit e  was
sufficien t to su ppor t p ers ona l jur isdict ion over t he Ca lifornia
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63. S ee id. at  133 3-34 . Th e di st ri ct  c ou r t  n ot ed tha t th e defendant u sed its web
page  to solicit I nt ern et u ser s, includin g Missour i resid ent s (who ha d accessed  th e site
131 ti me s), t o sig n u p for  it s m ai lin g lis t.  Th is a ct ivit y constitu ted not “passive”
a ctivity,  but  ra th er a  pur poseful a vailm ent  involving “active solicita tion ” a n d
“promot iona l activit y.” Id. at 1332-33. Base d on t his t ype of conscious solicita tion , th e
cour t  found t hat  the defendan t could reasona bly ha ve a nt icipa te d t he  poss ibili ty of
be ing ha led  int o a M iss our i cour t.  See id.  at 1334.
64. No. CI V. 95 -403 7, 1 996  WL 7 539 91 (S .D.  Ca l. Au g. 5 , 19 96).
65. S ee id. at *2-3. Because the Web enables easy worldwide access, a llowing
computer  i n t erac tion  v ia  t he Web  to s up ply s ufficie nt  cont act s t o est ab lish  jur isd icti on
would  evis cer at e t he  per son al  jur isd ict ion re quir em en t a s it  cur re nt ly ex ist s; t he
Cou rt  is not willing to tak e this st ep. Thus , the fact t hat  Fallon h as a web s it e used
by Californ ian s can not  est ablis h ju risd iction by it self. S ee Id. at  *3. 
66. 89 F.3d  1257 (6t h Cir . 1996). CompuServe r e m ains the semina l  ca se  in  the
field. In December of 1997, the Ninth Circuit decided a cyberspace  ju r isdiction case,
Cybersell, In c. v.  Cyb ersel l, I nc. ,  in which the court closely followed t he CompuServe
rat ionale. 130 F .3d 414 (9t h Cir . 1997). S ee dis cus sio n o f Cybersell infra  Pa r t  V.A.
The Sixth  an d Nin th  Circuit s ar e pre sen tly th e only tw o circui ts  which h ave dir ectly
ruled  on due process in cyberspace. It should be noted tha t at  the t ime Weber v. Jolly
Hotels, the su bject of this note, was  decided , Cybersell had not been decided.
company which  ha d n o other  significan t cont act s wit h
Missou ri. 63
The Maritz  decision stan ds in stark  contrast  t o McDonough
v. Fallon McElligott, Inc.,64 a case wh ich involved th e a lleged
infringem ent  of a copyr ight ed ph otogra ph . McDonough  is a
well-known  photographer who claimed t h a t  a  Minnesota
adver t is ing agen cy ha d u nla wfully u ti lized one of his
photographs.  See ki ng  da m a ges  an d in jun ctive relief,
McDonou gh filed su it in  a Ca lifornia  dis t r ict  cou r t . The cour t
held  th at  th e ability of Californ ia In ter net  users  to access the
Minnes ota-based  compa ny’s web site was insu f fi cien t, by i t se lf,
t o su pp or t  pe r son a l ju r isdict ion  over  the com pa ny wh ich  had n o
oth er s ignifican t cont act s wit h Ca lifornia .65
The inconsisten t r esult s rea ched by Maritz  and McDonough
under score the pressing need for a uniform a nd equitable test
for det erm inin g per sona l jur isdict ion in  cyberspace. Such a test
not  only would  gu ide t he low er  cour t s , b u t  als o would a llow
Int ern et  users t o know which types of activity on the In t e r net
will s ubject  them  to ju r isdict ion  in  a  rem ote for um.
C. The CompuSer ve Decision
 The Sixth  Circu it 199 6 holdin g in Com puS erv e, In c. v.
Patterson  sh ed  sign ifica n t  ligh t  on  the cyb er -ju r isdict ion
qua gmire. 66 Th is  was the first  feder al circu it  cour t  deci sion  tha t
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The Second Circuit  als o decided a cyberspace jurisdiction case in 1997, but ba sed
i t s deci sion  on t he  st at e lon g a rm  st at ut e (wh ich  requires  pre sence in  the forum and
is t h u s  m ore str ingen t t ha n du e process ) rat her  th an  a du e process  an alysis . S ee
Bensusan Restau ran t Corp. v. Kin g, 126 F.3d 2 5 (2d Cir. 1997). Th e Eigh th  Circuit
also decide d a ca se wh ich in volved t he I nt ern et a nd  per sona l jur isdiction , but did so
in  th e cont ext of tr ibal cour t su bject-m at ter  jur isdiction . S ee Horn ell Brew ing Co. v.
Rosebud Sioux Tr ibal Cou rt , 133 F .3d 1087 (8t h Cir . 1998). 
67. S ee Com puS erve, 89 F.3 d at  1260. 
68. S ee id . at 1260-61.
69. S ee id .
70. S ee id . at 1260.
71. S ee id . at 1261.
72. S ee id .
73. S ee id . 
74. S ee id .
75. S ee id .
dir ectly ru led on t he r equ irem ent s of due p rocess in  a cyber-
jur isdict ion  case . Comp uS er ve is a n O hio-ba sed  compa ny t ha t
offers nu mer ous software p roducts t o its subscribers th rough  a
p r og r a m called “sha rewa re .”6 7  T h r ou g h  t h is  p r og r a m,
Com puS er ve mar kets both its own software an d that  of others,
and enables its subscribers to “download” the  software on to
their  own comput ers from it s web page. 68 Pa t t e r son ,  a  res iden t
of Texas, was a s ubscriber wh o used CompuSer ve’s sha rewar e
system  to m ar ket  his  own s oftwa re  pr ogra ms.6 9 Alth ough
Pat terson never visited Ohio, h e an d Comp uS erve  ent ere d in to
an  agreement  which  p r ovided , inter alia,  tha t  it  was to be
governed by Ohio law.70
Between  1991 and 1994 Pat ter son tr an smit ted via comput er
th irty-two mast er  soft wa re fil es  to Com pu Se rve in  Oh io, which
were  then  displayed t o Compu Serve su bscribers over th e
In terne t .71 Compu Ser ve th us  esse nt ially fun ctioned as a
dist ribu tion  cen ter  from which  Pa t t e r son  market ed h i s
product s. When  sa les of Pa tt ers on’s pr oduct s wer e ma de in
Ohio and elsewher e, t he m oney w as t r ansm it t ed  from
Comp uS er ve in  Oh io t o Pat terson in Texas.72 In  tota l , l es s  than
$650 wor th  of Pa t t er son ’s  software was  sold to t welve Oh io
residents.73
When  CompuSer ve began t o mar ket  a p r oduct  tha t
Pat terson felt  wa s t oo sim ilar  to h is own , he n otified t he m b y E-
mai l of th eir alleged infringemen t  and  th rea tened  to commence
lit iga t ion .74 Com pu Se rve t hen  sou gh t  a  de cla ra tory ju dgmen t  of
non infr ingement  from an  Oh io cour t .75  The S ixt h  Cir cu it  found
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76. S ee id . at 1266.
77. S ee id . at 1265-66.
78. S ee id . at  1268. 
79. S ee Web er  v. J olly  Ho te ls,  977  F.  Su pp . 32 7, 3 30 (D .N .J . 19 97).
80. S ee id . at 329.
81. S ee id. 
82. S ee id . 
tha t  Patt erson’s  s t a tus a s a softwar e provider an d ma rk eter
demons tr at ed tha t  Pa t t e r son  had knowin gly rea ched  out  to
Ohio and benefitted from CompuServe’s services.76 Spe cifically,
th e cour t n oted th at  Pa tt erson h ad a dvert ised his softwar e over
the Int ern et  and inse r t ed  it  in to the s t rea m of comm er ce; h ad
ent ered  into a  cont ra ct via th e Int ern et wh ich was governed by
Ohio l aw; and  had or iginat ed and  ma in ta ined h is  con tact s  wi th
Ohio for  a  period of several years.77 The  Sixth  Circu it  he ld  tha t ,
based on these extensive acts, Pa t t e r son  had su ffi ci en t  con tact s
with  Ohio to support  th e exercise of pe r son al jur isdiction over
h im.78
Com puS erve s eemed  to demons t r a t e t ha t  cybe r -con tact s
could in de ed  se rve a s t he basi s for  pe r son a l ju r isdict ion  so long
as the  aggrega te of the In t erne t  act ivi ty and  add it iona l con tact s
rises  to th e level of purposefu l ava ilmen t. Bu t even  with  th is
base line guid a n ce fr om Com puS erve, lower cour ts  ha ve
con tinu ed to str uggle in defining th e jurisdictional limit s. To
da te the Supr eme Cour t h as r ema ined silent  on th e ma tt er.
Agains t  th is ba ckgr oun d, Weber v. J olly Hotels,  a  pe rsona l
inju ry s uit , ar ose in  th e Fe der al D ist rict  Cour t for N ew J er sey.
 
III. WE B E R  V. J O L LY  H O T E L S
A. Facts
 While  a gues t a t a n It alian  hotel in December  of 1994, New
J e r s ey citizen Eileen Weber fell and s ust ained  injuries. 79 The
hotel at which Weber was injured, th e J olly Diodora  Hot el, was
owned by a corpor at ion—Ita jolly Comp agn ia It alia na  Dei J olly
Hot els (her eina fter  J olly Hotels )–with  its  pr incipa l p la ce of
business in Va lda gno, It aly. 80 J olly Hotels  owns an d operat es
th irt y-two h otels  in I ta ly, and  its indepen dent  subsidiar ies own
a n d operate hotels in Holland, France, Belgium, and New
York .81 J olly Hotels does not conduct a ny bus iness in  New
J er sey. 82 “However, it does provide ‘photogra phs  of hotel rooms,
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83. Id . at  329  (qu oti ng  Br ief for  Pl ai nt iff a t 1 0).
84. S ee id . at 330.
85. S ee id. 
86. S ee id . at 331.
87. S ee id . at 331-32.
88. S ee id . We b er  as ser te d t ha t a  “foreign  comp an y is s ub ject  to p er son al
jur isd icti on  in any court t hat h as jurisdiction over the company’s independen t
con t r acto r , wh en t he com pa ny  ha s gi ven  th e in dep end ent  cont ract or t he ex clus ive r igh t
to solicit a nd  sell  its  prod uct .” Id . at  332.  Accordi ng  to We ber ’s a rg um en t, t he  cour t
had jurisdiction over J olly Hotels since Grand Cir cle Travel, its independent
con t r acto r , solicited Weber with adver tisemen ts an d brochures. The court r ejected th is
a rgumen t  on  the  ground that , in ter alia,  Grand  Circ le  Trave l  did  not  have  an
exclusive  righ t t o solicit pa tr ons for J olly Hote ls’ rooms. S ee Web er, 977 F . Sup p. a t
332. Beca us e t his  en tir e a rg um en t fa lls ou ts ide  th e scop e of t his  Not e it will not be
addressed  fur the r .
89. Web er st at ed t ha t: “ This Circuit ha s consistently held tha t advert isin g in
na t iona l publicat ions ‘does not const itu te cont inu ous a nd s ubst an tia l conta cts wit h t he
foru m sta te.’ ” 977  F . Supp.  a t  333 ( ci t ing  Geh ling v . S t . George’s Sch . of Med., 773
F.2d 539, 542 (3d C ir. 198 5)). Based  on th is posit ion, t h a t  adver t i s ing  in  na t iona l
pub li ca t ions does no t confer  gen er al j ur isd icti on, t he  cour t  fl a t ly  r ej ec t ed  Weber ’s
a rgumen t  th at  Jolly H otels’ advert ising over  th e Int ern et gr an ted ge ner al jur isdict ion .
90. See supra  no t es  88 and  89  fo r  an  e xp la n a t i on  of th e cou rt ’s re ject ion  of th e
two jurisdictional bases.
descr ipt ions of hot el fa cilit ies , [a nd] informa t ion  abou t  numbers
of rooms  and t e lephone  numbers ’ on  the  In t e rnet . ”83
As a  r e su l t of her in jury at  th e J olly Diadora H otel, Eileen
Weber  filed a law su it in t he Su perior Court  of New J ersey,
a l leging that  J ol ly  Hotels  knew or  should  have known of the
dangerous condition on its premises. Subsequ e n tly, the case
was removed on diversity grounds to the U nit ed  St a tes  Dis t r ict
Cou r t  for th e Dist rict  of New J er sey. 84 J olly Hote ls moved to
dism iss t he ca se  for  la ck of pe r son a l ju r isdict ion .85
In  response,  Weber  asse r ted  tha t  the cour t  had  persona l
ju r isdict ion  over J olly Hotels  under  t heor i es  of both  genera l and
sp ecific ju r isdict ion .86 Und er t he specific jur isdict ion claim ,
Weber alleged that  Jolly Hotels employed a n  independen t
tr avel agen t, Gr an d Cir cle Tra vel, who clea r ly did bu sin ess in
New J er sey, a nd was thus s ubject  to pe r son a l ju r isdict ion
th ere. 87 Weber argued th at  J olly Hotels stood in the sh oes of
Grand Circle Travel an d th erefore was it self subject  t o
jur isdict ion in  New  J er sey. 88
Second, Weber  cont en de d t ha t  J olly H otels ’ use  of th e
Int ern et  was equivalent  to advert ising in New J ersey, and  was
thus adequa te to estab li sh  general ju r isdict ion .89 The cour t
ultim at ely re jected  both  founda t ions  for  ju r isdict ion .90 Because
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91. Web er, 977 F . Sup p. at  334. 
92. S ee id . at  333  (cit in g H an son  v. D en ckl a,  357  U. S. 2 35,  250 -51 (1 958 )).
93. S ee id. (citing Compu Ser ve, Inc. v.  Pa tt er son , 89  F. 3d  125 7 (6t h C ir . 19 96)).
94. 952 F.  Su pp . 11 19 (W .D.  Pa . 19 97).
95. Weber , 977 F . Sup p. at  333 (quotin g Zippo, 952 F. Su pp. at  1124) (emph asis
ad de d).  
96. S ee id. Zippo employed a “sliding scale” with one end of t he  spect rum
a l lowing the exercise of jurisdiction and t he other  end n ot a llowin g ju ri sdi ction .
Between  the two opposite ends of the scale is a substantia l gray area . The “Web er”
model is almost identical to this “Zippo” model, after wh ich it was  pa t t erned . The
only difference between the two is that Zi ppo is a sliding scale, while Weber  is  broken
down int o th ree  specific classifica tion s. 
the stat ute of limitat ions had e xpir ed an d would ha ve barr ed
Weber’s cla im had  the cou rt  dism isse d it  wit h p re jud ice, th e
cour t  opt ed , in  “th e in ter es t s of ju st ice,” to t r ans fe r  t he case to
the United Stat es Distr i ct  Cour t  for  t he  Sou the rn Dis t r ict  of
New York  for  a  det e rmina t ion  of whether  New York  had
pe rson a l ju r isdict ion .91
B. The Cour t’s  Reason ing
 The Weber court  bega n b y  not i ng  th a t  t h e U n it ed Sta tes
Supreme Cou r t  lon g h as r ecogn ized t ha t  it s p er son a l
ju r isdict ion  fr amework  mus t  evolve wit h a dva nces in
te chn ology, communica t ion , and  t r anspor t a t ion .92 I n  li gh t  of
this, Weber conclu de d t ha t  the est abli sh ed  pr in cip les  of
persona l jurisdiction wer e ade qu a te t o res olve  pe rson a l
jurisdiction issu es ar ising from th e Int ern et. 93
Weber th en pr oceeded t o qu ote a n  ea r lie r  cybe r -ju r isdict ion
de cis ion  by a  fed er a l d is t r ict  cou r t  in P en ns ylvan ia, Zi ppo M fg.
Co. v. Z ippo Dot  Com,  Inc.94 Zippo held that “the likelihood that
persona l ju r isdict ion  can  be const itut ionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of comm ercial activity
tha t  an  ent ity cond uct s over  th e In te rn et .”9 5  Pa t t e rned a ft e r  a
slidin g scale model used by th e Zippo cour t ,96 Weber adopted a
th ree-t iered cl a ss ifi ca t ion  sys t em under  wh ich  cases  a re
cat egorized accordin g to their  level of commer cial conta ct over
the  In t e rnet :
Classification One: C a s e s  i n
w h i c h
“d e fe n d a n t s
a ct ive ly  d o
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97. Web er, 977 F. Supp. a t 333.
98. S ee id. 
99. S ee id. 
100. Id . 
busin ess  on
t h e
In terne t”;97
Cla ss ifica t ion  Two: C a s e s  i n
w h i c h
d e f e n d a n t s
o p e r a t e  a n
i n t e r a ct i ve
web sit e wit h
wh ich  user s
e x c h a n g e
informat ion ;98
Classification Thr ee: C a s e s
i n
w h i ch
defend
a n t s
s imply
p r ovid
e
in for m
a t i o n
o r
a d v er t
i s e m e
n t s on
p a s s iv
e web
sites.99
The Weber cou r t  ru led tha t , notwiths t anding Weber ’s
a rgumen t s t o the  con t r a ry,  “t his  case clea rly belon gs in
ca tegor y th re e.”100 Jo lly Hote ls  had  done  no busin ess
wha tsoever  in  Ne w J er se y; it  simply p la ced  in format ion  abou t
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101. S ee Smit h v. H obby Lobby St ores, I nc., 968 F . Sup p. 1356, 1365 (W.D.  Ark.
1997) (hold ing  tha t  an  advert i se m e n t  in  a  t rade  publica t ion  on  the In te rne t  was  an
insu ff ic ien t con tac t  wi th  the  fo rum s ta te (Arkansas ) because i t  “d id  not  con t r act  t o
sell  an y good s or  se rv ices t o an y citizens of Arkansas over the Internet site”); Hearst
Corp. v. Goldberger , No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997) (concluding  t hat a dvertising services on the In tern et were equivalen t to
adve r t is ing in a na tional maga zine, and th at u nder N ew York  law  such
adve r t is emen t s did  no t s at isfy  re qu ir em en ts  for  pe rs on al  ju ri sd ict ion ).
102. Web er, 977 F . Sup p. at  334. 
103. S ee id. at 332-34 (containing t he court’s specific and gene ra l ju ri sdi ction
an al ysi s).  
104. S ee CompuSer ve, Inc. v. Patte rson, 89 F.3d  1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996)
(noting  that  since CompuServe based its action on defendant P att er son ’s a ct of
send ing software to Ohio for sale, CompuServe sought to establish specific jur isd ict ion
over Pat ters on); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122
(W.D. Pa . 19 97) (n oti ng  th at  pla in ti ff “does  no t co nt en d t ha t [t he  c ou r t ] should
exercise general per s on a l juris diction [but ] concedes th at  if person al jur isdiction exis ts
in  th is ca se , it  mu st  be s pe cific”).
its  hotels on the Internet for advertisement purposes. Citin g
two other  dist r ict  cour t s  th at  ha d r ule d sim ilar ly,101 Weber
found tha t  exercisin g jur isdict ion over J olly Hotels  in t his
scena rio “would viol a te  the  Due  Process Clause of the
Four t een th Amendmen t [, ] . . . would be u nju st  an d would
disres pect th e prin ciples est a blish ed by In ternat iona l Shoe and
its  pr ogeny.”102
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Befud dled J urisdictional Ana lysis Which Ultim ately
Reaches the Correct Result
 Based  on the court’s  r eason ing in  Weber, it wou ld appear
tha t  perh aps n either  Weber’s at torney nor t he court wa s
complet ely clea r  on  wha t  cons t itu tes genera l ju r i sd ict ion .
Al though  the  cour t  at tem pted  to perform a separat e, individual
ana lysis for Weber ’s gen era l an d sp ecific jur isdict ion claim s,103
it  conspicuously muddled the  two.  Under  i ts general ju r isdict ion
ana lysis, the cou r t  pr opos ed  it s t h ree-t ier ed  cla ss ifica t ion
s t ructu r e—a mode l wh ich logically wou ld a pply only to cases of
specific jurisdiction. The court ’s classificat ion model relied
hea vily on Com p u S erve and Zippo, both of which rela ted
exclusively t o sp ecifi c ju r isdict ion .104
Alt h ough Weber er red  by con du ct in g it s s pe cific ju r isdict ion
ana lysis un der  th e la bel of gener al ju ris diction , th e  cou r t  was
cor rect  in  it s  u lt imate ru l ing  tha t  genera l ju r isdiction was
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105. S ee Int ern at ional Sh oe Co. v. Washin g t on, 3 26 U .S. 3 10, 3 18 (19 45); see also
Perk ins v. B en gu et  Con sol . Mi ni ng  Co.,  342  U. S. 4 37,  447 -49 (1 952 ).
106. Kulko v. Superior Cour t, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (holding th at  basin g
Californ ia  jurisdiction on 3-day and 1-day sto po ve r s  in  tha t sta te “would mak e a
mocker y” of du e p ro ces s li mi ta ti on s on  as se rt ion  of pe rs on al  ju ri sd ict ion ).
107. Hearst  Corp. v. Goldbe rg er , No.  96 CI V. 362 0, 19 97 WL  9709 7, a t *1
(S. D.N. Y. Fe b. 2 6, 1 997 ).
108. S ee McDonough  v . F a llon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL
753991, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (warning th at worldwide jur isd icti on b as ed on
the establishm ent of a web site “would eviscerate the p er son al j ur isd icti on
requ ir emen t as  it  cur re nt ly e xis ts ”).
inap propria te.  Gener a l ju r isdict ion  is cus tom ar ily gra nt ed only
a t  th e he ad qu ar te rs  of a corpora te  ent ity. 105 J olly  Hotels  not
only la cked  a  “center  of bu sines s” ope ra t ion s in New J ersey, but
it  had no sign i fi can t  con tact s  wha t soeve r  wi th the  st a t e . To
have gr an ted  gen er a l ju r isdict ion  b a sed on s uch  extr eme ly
limited  con tact s  wou ld “make  a  mocke ry of t he  limit a t ions on
st at e jur isdict ion im posed  by th e Fou rt een th  Amen dm en t.”106
Weber’s holding th at  a pa ssive web sit e  does not  cr ea t e
genera l jurisdiction was, however, sapien t.  As  a  di st r ict  cou r t  in
Californ ia  recent ly explained, to allow person a l  jur isdict ion in
such a case would be  extr eme ly dan gerou s beca us e “a findin g of
persona l jur isdict ion . . . bas ed on a n I nt ern et w eb sit e would
mean that  there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide)
persona l ju r isdict ion  over  anyon e a nd e ver yon e who esta blishes
an  In te rn et  web s ite .”107 The danger  and abs ur dit y of such  a
posit ion is obvious: it  wou ld  la rgely er adica te t he fou nda t ion  of
persona l ju r isdict ion .108  Even th ough th e cour t blun dered by
conduct ing it s s pe cific ju r isdict ion  ana lys is  unde r  the t it le of
genera l ju r isdict ion , th e court ’s sp ecific jur isdict ion m odel its elf
is  wor thy of examin a t ion .
B. The Weber  Clas si fi cat ion  S chem e for  S peci fi c J uri sd ict ion :
Incom plete and Va gue, but a S trong Found ation on which to
Bu ild
 The n ext section of th is Note focuses  on  whether  the specific
ju r isdict ion  model propounded by Weber r e spect s  t he Supreme
Cour t ’s per sona l jur isdict ion fra mew ork, a nd  whe th er or  not  it
is funct iona l  a s a  p ract i ca l  mat ter .  In  l igh t  of the  fact  tha t
cour t s  acros s  the  coun t ry a re  adop t ing  a  Weber-like an alys is for
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109. S ee gen eral ly,  e.g., Scherr  v. Abraham s, No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL 299678
(N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998); Vitullo v. Velocity Power boats, In c., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 WL
246152 (N.D . Ill.  Apr . 27, 1 998); B lumen tha l v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp . 44 (D.D.C.
199 8); Thom pson  v. Ha nda -Lopez, In c., 998 F. S upp . 738 (W.D. Tex. 19 98). 
110. See Com pus erve , Inc. v. P at ter son, 89  F.3d  1257, 126 3 (6th  Cir. 19 96), an d
Cybers ell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997), both of which use
the sam e th ree-pr onged m inim um  conta cts t est d escrib ed above in the text; see also
dis cus sion  supra  Par t II.A.3.
111. Weber v. J olly Hotels, 977 F . Supp . 327, 333 (D.N.J . 1997) (citing Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Su pp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. P a. 1996) (emp ha sis
ad de d)).
112. S ee Zippo, 952  F.  Su pp . a t 1 124  (“At on e en d of t he  sp ect ru m  a r e  s it u a t ions
cybe r -ju r isdict ion  cases , th e an swer s t o th ese qu est ions m erit
ca re fu l  a t t en t ion .109
1. The Weber m odel is incomplete
 One of the in heren t pr oblems wit h t he Weber model is  tha t
it  is st ru ctu ra lly in com plete . Ther e is n o quest ion th at  even in
cybe rsp ace all three prongs of t he  min imum contact s  t es t  need
to be addres sed .110 Ye t  a  ca re fu l  examina t ion  of the  Weber
model revea ls t ha t  it fa ils t o do so. The court  seem s t o th ink
tha t  ap plicat ion of its m odel, with  not hin g mor e, is adequ at e for
dete rmin ing whe th er ju ris diction  is appr opriat e in a given case.
In  actua lit y, h owever , t he m ode l in dica tes  only whe ther  the
first  p rong  of the minimum  conta cts test (pu rposefu l  ava i lmen t )
is sat isfied. The Weber cour t  s eems unaware  tha t  i t s t e st
complet ely neglects the second and third prongs of the
test—relatedness and reasonableness.
2. T he th ree clas si fi cat ion s of  th e Weber  m odel
 The Weber model classifies cases into one of th ree  g roup ings
on th e ba sis of a de fenda nt ’s qu ali t a t ive con tact s  with  the
forum sta t e . E ach of th e th ree classes will be described an d
th en  analyzed to determine whether or not it  sat is fi es  the
pu rpos efu l a va ilm en t  requ ir em en ts of t he S upr em e Cour t .
a. Clas si fi cation  On e: Defen dan ts  who act iv ely  conduct
business over the Internet. Classification One includes  cases  in
which  “defendant s enter into con tracts wit h  res iden t s of a
foreign  ju r isdict ion  tha t  involve th e knowing and repeated
tr an sm ission  of compu ter  files over the  In te rn et .”111 Defendant s
in  th i s cat egory consciously a re e nga ged in  conduct ing business
in  cyberspace.112 Weber does n ot m ak e clear  which  specific
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where a de fenda nt  clear ly does bu sine ss over  th e In ter net .”). 
113. S ee Web er, 977 F. Supp. at  333. 
114. Burger  Kin g Cor p. v . Ru dze wicz , 47 1 U .S.  462 , 47 4-75  (198 5).
115. Kulko v. S up er ior  Cou rt , 43 6 U .S.  84,  92 (1 978 ) (quotin g  Hanson  v . Denckla ,
357 U. S. 2 35,  246  (195 8)).
116. Defendant s “who ‘rea ch out  beyond on e sta te a nd cr eat e contin uin g
rel a t io n sh ips an d obli gat ions  wit h cit izen s of a not he r s ta te ’ ar e su bject  to r egu lat ion
and san ction s in  the o ther  Sta te for  the c on seq uen ce s of t hei r  act iv it ie s.” Burger K ing,
471 U.S. at 473 (quotin g Traveler s Hea lth Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U .S. 643, 647
(195 0)).
117. Id . at  474 (citing World -Wide Volkswagen  Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (198 0)).
118. S ee i d . at 478-79.
business act ivi t ie s  would be included in Class ification One.
Pr esu ma bly, th ough , act s su ch a s se lling s er vice s or t an gible
goods an d en ter ing in to bin din g cont ra cts a ll would  be classified
as “business” on  the  In te rnet .  Weber  holds  tha t  persona l
jurisdiction is gener ally appr opriat e in th is class of cases.113
In  order to test whether  this classifi ca t ion  sa t is fi es  due
process requirements, it  is necessary t o ma ke t he following
inq uir y: Ha s a  defen da nt  who en ter s in to contr act s wit h
res iden t s of a foreign  jur isdict ion th at  involve th e kn owing a nd
repea ted  tr an sm ission  of compu ter  files pur posefully availed
its elf of the p rot ections  an d ben efits of th e laws of th at  foreign
ju r isdict ion ? As out lin ed  by t he Supr em e Cou r t , pu rpos efu l
ava ilment  gener ally is s at isfied wh en a  defen da nt  deliberat ely
ha s creat ed a “subst an tial connection” with  th e foru m st at e.114
In  looking for  pu rposefu l  ava i lmen t , t he  fact s  must  be
weighed to de ter min e whet her  the r equis it e “affilia t ing
ci r cums tan ces” a re  pre sen t .115 A pa r ty wh o “reach[es ] out
beyon d one state and create[s] cont inuing relationships and
obliga t ion s with t he citizens of another  s t a te” l ike ly  has ava iled
its elf of that  stat e’s protections and benefits.116 En te ring into
con t r act s wit h r esid en ts  of a pa rt icula r s ta te  wh ich in volve t he
knowing and repeat ed tran smission of comput er  files seems to
satisfy th is r equ irem ent . Becau se t he d efend an t s pecifically has
t ar geted  th at  pa rt icular  st at e it s eem s fair  th at  it s h ou ld
“reasonab ly  an t icipa te  be ing  ha led in to cour t  the re.”117
Nevertheless, the  Supreme Cour t  in  Bu rger King s t at ed
tha t  s imply  en te r ing  in to a  con t ract  with  an  ou t -of-st a te
par ty—wit h ou t  m or e —d oe s n ot  a u t om a t ically establish
suffi cien t  minimum conta cts.1 1 8  The  Sixth  Circu it in
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119. CompuServe,  Inc. v. Patt erson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Ci r.  199 6) (citing
Bu rger  K ing, 471 U.S . at  478). 
120. Weber v. Jolly H otels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Zippo
Mfg. Co. v . Zip po D ot C om , In c., 9 52 F . Su pp . 11 19,  112 4 (W. D. P a.  199 7)).
121. S ee, e.g., Thom p s on  v . H a nda -Lopez, Inc., 998 F. S upp. 73 8, 741 (W.D. Tex.
1998) (involving a web site purportin g to operate th e “World’s Largest  Inter net
Ca sin o”).
122. Because CompuServe wa s t he  onl y cir c u it  c ou rt  gu ida nce  th e lowe r cou rt s
had (up  un t il  Cybersell in December of 1997), it  appears tha t  Zippo and Weber  simp ly
based  th eir  cat egor i za t ion crite ria  on th e specific fact scena rio involved in
CompuServe. 
Com pu S erve held  th at  th is pr inciple a pplies  equ ally in
cyberspace: “Admit te dly, m er ely en te rin g in to a  con t r act  w ith
Comp uS er ve would not, with out m ore, establish that P att erson
had min imu m cont act s wit h O hio.”119 Yet the Weber
cla ss ifica t ion  deems a  defendan t t o purposefully have a vailed
its elf when  it  en t er s  in to con t r a cts  involvin g th e “knowin g an d
re pea te d t ra ns mis sion of compu te r files  over t he  In te rn et .”120
Perha ps in  the m ajor it y of cases, defen da nt s en ter ing in to
such  con t ract s  involving knowing  and repea ted  t ransmiss ions
likely wil l h ave com m i t ted s ome a ddit iona l act s t ha t e leva te
th em to th e level of purposeful availment. However, because
the definit ion of Classificat ion On e is so br oad, it  fails t o
adequa tely  dist ingu ish  bet ween  pa rt ies wh o ha ve sim ply
con t ract ed and  those  who have commi t ted the  r equ is it e
a ddi t ion a l acts.  It  is  cer t a in ly p oss ible t ha t  som e of t he
defendan t s w h o fall u nd er  Clas sificat ion On e m ay n ot h ave
incur red such  add it iona l con tacts. The overinclusive, broad-
brush  app roach  of Cla ss ifica t ion  On e is  ther efor e u naccept able
because it  sweeps in too man y defendant s.
As for th e ut ility of this  cl a ss ifi ca t ion , t he  fact  t ha t  it
focuses on wh eth er or  not  bus ines s h as  been  conduct ed is qu ite
help ful. A cour t gen era lly ca n  as cert ain  whe th er a  pa rt icular
web site h as be e n  used specifically to derive revenu e.121 The
por t ion  of the d efin it ion  wh ich  focuse s on  wh et h er  a  defendan t
has enga ged in  kn owing a nd  rep eat ed t ra ns mis sions,  however,
is of less u t ili ty. This  asp ect  of Cla ss ifica t ion  One ’s defin ition is
clear ly derived from t he s pecific fact  scenar io of Com puS erve.122
While  pe rhaps  help fu l in  som e ca se s,  su ch  a  ca se-specific
definit ion cannot  be  ea si ly a pp lie d t o a ll of t he va r ied  fact
pa t t erns which arise in cyber-jurisdiction cases. In  sp it e of this,
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123. S ee generally , e.g., Edbe rg v. N eogen C orp., N o. 3:98CV00717, 1998 WL
458249 (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 1998) (inv olving a web site which contains a  toll-free
o rde r ing num ber, and allows users to E-mail defendan t s  w it h  qu es ti on s or  com me nt s);
Sche r r v. Ab rah ams , No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL 299678 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998)
(involving a web site which allows users to add th eir E-mail address to an address
list so that  information ma y be sent); Blumenth al v. Drudge, 9 92  F . Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1998) (involving a web page which allows users to both directly E-m ail d e fendan t  and
request  su bs cri pt ion s t o de fen da nt ’s pu bli cat ion s).
124. Zippo, 952 F .  Supp .  a t  1124 (ci t ing  Marit z, In c. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 132 8 (E .D.  Mo. 1 996 )).
125. S ee Web er, 977 F. Supp. at  333.
however, th e model ha s widely been cited as t he a ccepted
mechanism for ana lyzing cyber-contacts.
b. Clas si ficat ion  T wo: Cases  in  which  a  defendant
m aintai n s an  in teractiv e web sit e allow in g users  to exchan ge
informat ion wi th  the host com puter. Classificat ion Two
encompass es defendan t s  who make In te rn et  conta cts t hr ough
an  in ter act ive  web s it e. C ase s fa lling wi th in  th is  cla ss ifica t ion
lie in  a  di fficu lt  gr ay a rea . Seemin gly, it  wou ld  en compa ss  any
cyber-act ivity which  does n ot r ise t o th e level of ent erin g int o
busin ess contra cts, yet const itut es more t ha n  me re  ad ver tis ing.
The pot en t ia l r ange of a ct ivi t ies  wh ich  in volve  the exch ange of
informa tion via cyberspace appears quite broad.
Again,  Weber es se n t ia lly g ives n o gu idance on  wh at  sp ecific
types  of act ivi t ies t h is  wou ld  in clu de . A s u r vey of recent  cases
indicates  th a t  perhaps t his classification may encompass,
pr edom ina nt ly, interactive web pages tha t per form funct ion s
such  as  re ceiving a  us er ’s n am e, ph one n um ber , ad dr ess , an d
an  indication of interest .123 Whi le  not  en ter ing  in to a  con t r act  i n
th i s sce nar io, t he u se r  may s ign  up t o be  placed  on a  m a iling
list, or receive som e type of in format ion  by m ail.  Alt hough  not
specifically me nt ioned  by Weber, t he d is t in gu ish in g fa ctor
between  t h ese  types  of Cla ss ifica t ion  Two si tua t ion s a nd t hose
of Classification One would be th at  no money chan ges han ds. In
such  case s, “th e exercise of jurisdiction is det erm ined by
exam inin g th e level of inter act ivity a nd  commer cial na t u r e of
the excha nge  of informa tion  th at  occur s on t he  Web sit e.”124
Accordin g to Weber,  pe r sona l ju r isdict ion  may or  may not be
found in such cases.125
The focus of t he cou r t  in  Cla ss ifica t ion  Two ca s es , a s Weber
spells  ou t ,  shou ld be on  the  interactions. More spe cifically, it
shou ld address how much in t e ract ion  is  goin g on  and what
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126. S ee generally, e.g.,  Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computi ng, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 34 (D.
Mass. 1997) (holding personal jurisdiction to be appropriate ov er  n o n res iden t
corp ora tion  on t he  ba sis  of its  int er act ive w eb s ite  wh ich s ta te d t ha t it  wou ld “go to
a n y cus tom er[’]s site!”); Haelan P rods. Inc. v. Beso Biological Resear ch, Inc., No. 97-
0571, 1997  U.S . Dis t. L EXIS  1056 5 (E. D. La . J uly  11, 1 997) (h oldin g pe rs ona l
jur isd icti on  to be appropriat e based on th ree factors: (1) defendan t’s advertisem ents
in  nat ional periodicals; (2) defendant’s national toll-free telep hone num ber; and  (3)
de fendan t ’s web sit e wh ich ad vert ised in  an  Int ern et m all). 
kin ds of int era ctions  ar e involved. Th e “level of int era ctivity”
appea r s to descr ibe  a  qu ant it a t ive  ana lys is , look in g a t  how
many exchanges  occur . The focus on t he “comm ercia l na tu re” of
the excha nge , in cont ra st , seems to denote  a  qua li t at i ve
ana lysis. The “bottom line” question in deciding whether  or  not
to exercise  jur isdict ion in t his  class  of ca ses  is  whe ther  t he  fact s
more closely resem ble Cla ssificat ion On e (actively  en ter ing  in to
business con t r a ct s ) or  C la s s ifi ca t ion  T h r ee (pass ive,
in form at ion a l we b s it es ).
Because  of the  br oad, a mb iguous na tu re of Clas sificat ion
Two, it is difficult to det erm ine whet her  or not it sa tisfies th e
Supreme Court ’s definition of pur poseful availmen t. Her e th e
deciding factor  will likely  be  the n on-In ter net  contact s.
Cer ta in ly a s imp le in te ra ctive web pa ge, if combined  with oth er
non-Int ern et  contact s cou ld  r ise t o the le vel  of purposefu l
a va i lmen t .126 However, it is also foreseea ble tha t a  cou r t
seek ing to app ly Cla ss ifica t ion  Two’s over ly inclu sive d efin it ion
could sw eep in  de fen da nt s w ho had n ot  commit te d a cts r isin g to
the level of purp oseful a vailm ent . This  dist inct  possibilit y
would cau se Classificat ion Two to violate due process, and thu s
ma kes  it  unaccep table  as a  tes t  for  deter minin g cyber-
ju r isdict ion .
The usefulness of this classification is limited by the sam e
factor  which ma kes it u na ccepta ble fr om  a due process
s t andpoin t—i t s overreaching broadness. The  definit ion gives no
su bst an tive  cr i t er i a  for  dete rmin ing when  the  exercise of
jur isdict ion is or is not ap propria te in Cla ssificat ion Two cases .
It  is even  less h elpful s ince it  fails t o provide gu ida nce on  how
non-Int ern et  con tact s should be figured into the equation. As a
res u lt  of th is , Class ifica t ion  Two’s d efin it ion  is  of only marg ina l
ut ility to In terne t  use rs  and  t h e cour t s . In terne t  use rs  a re  not
given suffi cien t  gu idance a s  t o wh a t  cybe r -act ivi t ies  wil l subject
t hem  to ju r isdict ion  in  a  dist an t  forum. An d fr om a  cour t ’s
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127. S ee Kulk o v. Super ior Cour t, 436 U .S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting E stin  v. Es t in ,
334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948) (“We recogn ize tha t th is determ ination is one in which few
answers will be w ri tt en  in ‘bla ck a nd  wh ite . Th e gr eys  ar e dom ina nt  an d ev en  am ong
them  th e sh ade s ar e inn um era ble.’”). 
128. Web er, 977 F. Supp. a t 333.
129. Such  pa ssi ve we b sit es a re  lik e bil lboa rd s wh ich m er ely p rov ide  infor ma tion
or  advertisement s to users. A passive web site that  does l it t le  more  than make
infor ma tion  available to those who ar e in terested in it  is not grounds for the exercise
of per sona l jur isdiction . S ee, e.g., Bensusan  Res t au rant  Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y 1996), aff ’d , 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). However, some have pointed
to the u nique char acter ist ics o f th e In te rn et  wh ich m ay d ist ing uis h it  from  tr ad iti ona l
form s of comm un ica ti on. S ee, e.g., Inset  System s, Inc. v. Instr uction Set, In c., 937 F.
Supp. 161 , 16 3 (D.  Con n.  199 6) (a rg u i n g t h a t beca use  th ey ar e “always  accessib le,”
pas sive web sites are s t r on ger contacts th an t elevision, radio, and n ewspaper
ad ver ti sin g); see also Christ ine E. Ma yewsk i, The Presence of a Web Site as a
Constitutiona lly Perm iss ible B asi s for  Pers ona l J ur isd icti on , 73 IN D . L.J . 297, 324-27
(1997) (arguing t hat  because of the u nique cha racter istics of a web site, t hose who
use it in  adve rt ising a re d oing m ore t ha n sim ply post ing a  billboar d). 
130. S ee Cybersell,  Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(observing  th at  per son al j ur isd icti on is  not  ap pr opriate bec au se  “[a]ll  th at  [th e
de fendan t ] did was post an essentially passive home page on  th e web”);  Weber, 977
F . Supp . at 333; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,  952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa . 199 7) (obse rv ing  th at  per son al j ur isd icti on is  not  appropriate “where a
de fendan t has simply posted informat ion on an Int ernet Web sit e which  is accessible
to us er s in  for eig n j ur isd ict ion s”).
pers pective, even if a cour t corr ectly iden tifies w hich
defendan t s shou ld fa ll int o Class ification Tw o, the  an alys is is
not  finished since even within its own  range of cases  purposefu l
ava ilment  m ay or m ay  not be sa tis fied. It  is a  d iffi cu l t  judgment
call at  best. In  fairnes s to th e Weber cour t ,  however, the U.S.
Supreme Court  itself has  acknowledged the difficult y of ma kin g
deter mina tions involving the m inimu m conta cts test .127
c. Clas si fi cat ion  T hree: Cases  i n  which defendants have
sim ply posted informat i on  on  an In ternet web site which is
accessible to users in foreign jurisd ictions. Cla ss ifica t ion  Thr ee
dea ls with p ass ive web sites—those “t h a t  mer ely pr ovide
in form a t ion  or a dver tis em en ts  to u ser s.”128 This class of cases
typ ically involves  Internet  web pages  tha t  con t a in
advertisements, p romot iona l  in format ion ,  tol l-free t e lephone
num bers, E-mail a dd res se s,  or  biograph ica l da ta  on a
corpora t ion , orga niza tion , club, or fa mily. I n es sen ce, th ey ar e
noth ing more  than  bi llboards tha t  can  be seen  a round  the
world.129 Weber holds  tha t  persona l  ju r isdict ion  is  gen er a lly  not
found in th ese cases.130
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ S H U R - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1690 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
131. S ee Mallin ckrodt Medical, Inc. v. Sonus Ph arm s., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265, 272
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding t ha t m essa ges post ed on t he In ter net  (“AOL”) were  not be ing
pur posefully dir ect ed  tow ar d r es ide nt s of t he  Dis tr ict  of Colu mb ia ).
132. H earst  Corp. v. Goldberger, N o. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, a t *1 0
(S. D.N. Y. Fe b. 2 6, 1 997 ).
133. Burger  King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (quoting Travelers
Hea lth  Ass’n v. Virginia , 339 U.S . 643, 647 (1950 )). 
134. S ee, e.g., Pa na vision I nt ’l, L.P. v. T oeppen , 141 F .3d 1316, 1321 (9th C ir.
1998) (“[N]o cou rt  had ever h eld that  an In tern et advert isement  alone is sufficient to
su bject  a party to jurisdiction in another st ate.  .  . .  In  each  case  where  persona l
jur isd icti on  was exercised, there h ad been ‘someth ing more’ to ‘indicate tha t th e
de fendan t purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activi ty  in  a  subs tan t ia l  way
to th e forum  sta te.’ ” (quotin g Cybersell, 13 0 F .3d  at  418 ) (cit at ion  om it te d)).
135. S ee, e.g., Sun belt Corp. v. Noble, Dent on & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 33 n.10
(3d Cir .  1993)  (ho ld ing s ingle  ad in  na tional p ublication received in forum state
in su fficie nt ); Nichols v. G.D. Sear le & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding  th at  ad ver ti sin g a nd  soli cit at ion  act ivities alone do not constitu te th e
min imum contacts required for genera l jurisdiction); Wenche Siemer v. Learjet
Acqui sit ion  Corp., 96 6 F.2d  179, 181, 18 4 (5th  Cir. 19 92), cert . d eni ed , 506 U.S. 1 080
(1993) (holding no constitutional jur isdiction wher e defendant a dvertised  in  na t iona l
journa l s distributed in forum and m ailed informa tion to prospecti ve cu stom ers  in
fo ru m ); Williams v. Bowman Livest ock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128, 1131 (10t h  Ci r .
1991) (holding advert ising in multiple tr ade ma gazines insufficient to  suppor t  genera l
ju ri sd ict ion ); Cha rlie F owler E van gelist ic Ass’n v. Ces sna  Aircra ft Co., 911 F.2d 1564,
The la ck of jur isdiction in Classificat ion Three cases
appea r s to be in  ha rmony with  the minimum con tact s pa ra digm
of the  Suprem e Cou r t . Th e r ea son  ju r isdict ion  is  not
appropr ia t e in  thes e ca se s i s qu it e s im ple: post in g in for m at ion
on a  pa ss ive  web s it e a cces sible  to anyon e with Intern et access
lacks th e fundam enta l element of “ta rgeting.” A defenda nt  who
post s su ch a  pa ge clear ly ha s n ot r each ed out  an d dir ected  his
act ivity a t  a  speci fi c forum.131 As  a  di st r ict  cou r t  r ecen t ly
observed, because  th is  type of pass ive  adver t is in g on  the
Int ern et  “ma y be viewe d by p eople in all fifty st at es (an d a ll
over the w or l d t oo for  tha t  mat te r ),  . .  . i t  is  not  t a rgeted  a t  the
residen t s of Ne w York or  an y oth er  pa rt icula r s ta te .”132 Mer ely
pos t ing someth ing on a web pa ge does not  cons t it u t e  an act ivi ty
by wh ich one “reach[es] out beyond one state and create[s]
con t inu ing r ela t ion sh ips a nd ob liga t ion s w it h  cit izens of
an other  st at e.”133 No subs t an t ia l  connect ion is  crea te d, n o
con t inu ing obligat ion is es ta blish ed, a nd  no sp ecific ben efits a re
derived from t he postin g of th e web site.134
Pa ssive  web sites a re a kin t o advert isemen ts. Mer e
adver t is ing in  a  pa r ticu lar  forum —with out  mor e—gener ally is
not  sufficient to subject a defendant to person a l ju r isdict ion .135
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1566 (11t h C ir . 19 90)  (“ This cour t h as h eld th at  an  adver tis em en t  in  a  fo rum st a t e
newspaper  . . .  w as  no t a  ‘pur pos efu l a va ilm en t of t he  benefit s a nd  pr ote ction s of
[ the forum st ate’s] laws’. . . .” (citat ion omit ted )); Wines v. La ke H ava su B oat M fg.,
Inc.,  846 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding no jurisdiction based on a dvert i se m e n ts
in  na ti on al  tr ad e p ub lica ti on s); C as cad e Co rp . v. H ia b-F oco AB, 619 F.2d 36, 37-38
(9th  Cir . 198 0) (h oldi ng  ad ver ti se me nt  in  na ti ona l pu blica t ions ava ila ble i n for um
s ta t e insufficient for jurisdiction); Seymour  v. Park e, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587
(1st Cir. 1970) (holdin g adver tisin g by ma il in forum  sta te in su fficien t  con tac t  fo r
persona l ju ri sd ict ion ).
Thus, by analogy, passive web pages alone also sh ould not be
su fficien t to subject a defend an t t o personal jur isdiction. To
hold tha t  such  a  defen da nt  ha s pu rp osefully ava il ed  it se lf of the
pr ivilege of condu ctin g activit ies wit h i n t he  pa r t i cu la r  forum
s ta t e is u nfa ir  and  would v iola te due process, par ticular ly when
no contract or relationship has been created.
Weber’s definit ion of Classifica t ion  Th ree  is  much more
he lpfu l th an  th e pr evious  tw o definit ions. Because  cour t s  and
individua ls experience little difficulty in r ecognizing “pas sive”
web si t es , t h is  cla ss ifica t ion  offer s a  sa fe h arbor  for  t h ose  who
seek  to a void being s ubject ed t o litigat ion in for eign
jur is di ct ions. It  is  thus a  use ful s t anda rd for  de fin in g sa fe
cyber-a ctivit y, an d ha s consequ ent ly been accepted by nea rly a ll
court s.
3. The Weber m odel, a s a  whole, i s u naccep ta ble
 Ostens ibly th e Weber model appea r s  t o b e a  b r ig h t line ,
ca tegor ica l tes t for d ete rm inin g jur isdict ion by ne at ly dividin g
cases into one of th ree classes.  Several p roblem s in her ent  in
Weber’s s t r uctur e an d cont ent  un derm ine its va lidity, however.
F i rs t , th e Weber mode l is  in complet e in  tha t  it  doe s n ot
adequat ely add res s a ll t h ree  pr ongs  of the “min im um contact s”
t e st . Second , Weber la rgely fa ils  to pr ovid e gu idance on  how
non-Int ern et  acts sh ould be factored into th e cyber -ju r isdict ion
equa t ion . Thir d, t he  defin ition s of th e clas sificat ions s imp ly do
not  p rov ide adequa te guidan ce on h ow to distinguish  between
the th ree levels. For inst an ce, wha t  distinguishes a
Cla ss ifica t ion  One, “actively conduct i n g bu sines s” ca se  from a
Cla ss ifica t ion  Two, “in ter act ive  Web  si t e” case ? Fur ther , the
Cla ss ifica t ion  Two de fin it ion  holds t ha t  case s  in  tha t  ca t egory
m ay or m ay  not const itut e pur posefu l  availment. What types of
factors determine whether it  does or does not ? Weber sim ply
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leaves one gr asp in g for  som e d et a ile d cr it er ia  wit h  wh ich  to
draw distinctions.
Because  of t he  incomple t e and  nebu lous  na tu re of i t s t h ree-
tiered  t e st ,  Weber would  allow t he  exercise of jur isdict ion in
some case s w her e a  de fen da nt ’s con du ct  had n ot  r is e n t o the
req uis ite  level of p urpos efu l availment. This would violate due
process an d t hu s m ilita te s a gain st  us ing Weber in it s cu r ren t
sta te.  Notwiths t anding i t s shor t comin g s,  the Weber model  has
some utility. It  does provide a helpful mechanism for
“t rans la t ing” cybe rsp ace con tact s into th e pur poseful availmen t
language of min imum contact s . I f the  inheren t  “bugs” in  the
Weber model could be worked ou t , th e mode l would gr eat ly
assist court s faced with cyber-jurisdiction issues.
V. F I X I N G  T H E  WE B E R  MO D E L
 T h e first pr oblem with t he Weber model is  quit e easily
solved: th e mode l’s in complet ene ss ca n be  overcome by sim ply
augment ing it  wit h  an  ana lys is  of the s econd a nd  th ird  pr ongs
of th e min imum contact s  t es t . Once  a  cour t  has  resolved the
i ssue of purposefu l  ava i lment  by  using Weber’s th ree
cla ss ifica t ion s,  i t  shou ld  t h en  address th e issues of relatedness
and reasonab leness . The “bolstered” Weber model would then  be
comprised of not  jus t  one  prong  of the  min imum contacts test ,
but  all th ree.
Weber’s problems of having broad, vague categories and
exhibit ing a  dear th  of guidance on how to han dle non-Int ern et
con tact s will require a  more su bsta nt ive modi fica t ion  of th e
model.  De ta ile d cr it er ia  need t o be  de velope d t o guide courts in
knowing into which classification a defendant  should pr operly
be pla ced. F ur th er mor e, a fr am ework  nee ds t o be des igne d in
which  court s can analyze both a de fendan t ’s  In terne t  and non-
Intern et conta cts.
A. Establish ing Detailed Criteria with W hich to Measure
Pu rp osefu l A va ilm ent i n  Cybersp ace
 S in ce t h e  Su p r em e Cour t  has  not  yet  addres sed  cyber-
ju r isdict ion , the most  logica l sources  from which to obtain these
des cript ive cr i te r ia  a r e  Com puS erve and Cybersell—the first
and most  in flu en t ia l cir cu it  cour t  opin ion s to h ave d irect ly
add ress ed th e ma tt er. An an alysis of th ese two cases  provides
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ S H U R - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1663] WEBER v . JOLLY HOTELS 1693
136. S ee dis cus sio n o f CompuS erve supra Pa rt  II.C. 
137. S ee Com pu Se rv e, I nc.  v. P at te rs on , 89  F. 3d  125 7, 1 260 -61 (6 th  Cir . 19 96).
138. S ee id . at 1266-68.
139. 130 F. 3d  414  (9t h C ir . 19 97).
140. S ee id . at 415.
141. S ee id . 
some fundamenta l  p r incip les  wh ich  help  to fles h  out  the
sk elet al fr am ework  pr ovided by Weber.
1. R evisit in g Comp uS er ve
 As discussed above,1 3 6  Com puServe involved an  individual
who u t i li zed a  software company to adver t ise  and  market  h i s
own  softwa re pr oducts. The ind ividual, Pa tt erson, never
actua l ly vis it ed  the for um st a t e of Oh io.137 Neve rt he less , th e
Sixt h  Cir cu it  found that  Patt erson had  d is t r ibu ted  h is  software
t h r ough the Ohio-ba se d Compu Se rve,  en ter ed  in to a  cont ract
govern ed by Ohio law, tra nsm itted n early th ree dozen softwa re
files t o CompuServe via cyber spa ce, an d delibe ra tely
ma inta ined  his conta cts with  Com puServe for several years.138
Com puS erve is inst r u ct ive  because  it  wa s t he fir st  cir cu it  cour t
opinion  t o subs ta nt iat e th e pr oposition t ha t I nt ern et a ctivity
ma y inde ed  se rve a s t he fou nda t ion  for  the p rope r  exe rcise of
pe rson a l ju r isdict ion .
2. Th e guida nce of Cyber sell
 Alth ough  not decided un til after  Com puS erve and Weber,
th e Sixt h Cir cuit ’s decision in  Cybersell,  Inc. v. Cybersel l, I nc.139
also pr ovid es  gu id in g pr in cip les  wh ich  can  be used  to
str ength en  an d clarify the Weber paradigm. Cybersell,  Inc. is an
Arizon a  corpor a t ion  (Cyb er se ll AZ) which  p r ovides Int ern et
adver t is ing and  market ing services.140 In Augus t of 1994 it filed
an  applicat ion seeking to regist er  “Cyber sell” as  a  service  mark,
which  petit ion was gra nt ed in October of 1995. Cybersel l AZ
ma inta ined  a web site using the mar k from August 1994 to
Februa ry 1995. The web site was t h e n  rem oved  from the
In terne t  for  recons t ruct ion .141
In  the m ea nt im e, a  fa ther -son  tea m in  Flor ida form ed a
corpora t ion , Cybersell, Inc. (Cybersell FL), which provides
business consu lt ing ser vices for  st r a tegi c market in g on  the
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142. S ee id .
143. S ee id. 
144. Id . at 416.
145. Id . 
146. S ee id .
147. S ee id . at  419-20. 
148. S ee id . at  419. 
149. S ee id . at 420.
web.142 At t he  tim e Cyber sell F L chose it s n am e, Cybersell AZ
did  n ot  have i t s h ome p age on  the web, a nd i t s a pp lica t ion  for
the serv ice  mark h a d  n ot yet been gran ted.143 To fu r the r i t s
m a r ketin g objectives Cybersell FL creat ed a h ome page wh i ch
conta ined a “Cybersell” logo, a local phone nu mber ,  and an
in vit a t ion  for  users  to in t roduce  themse lves . To companies  not
yet on th e web, but in ter ested  in get t i n g on, t he  hom e pa ge
in vi ted them to “Email  us to find ou t  how!”144
When  Cyb er se ll AZ d iscover ed  th is  Flor ida-ba se d h ome page
in  Novemb er 1 995 it  sen t a n E -ma il notifyin g Cybers ell FL  tha t
it  alrea dy owned th e “Cyber sell” service m ar k. E vent ua lly
Cybers ell AZ filed su it in  th e Dist rict  of Arizona  “allegin g
t r ademark infringement , unfair competition, frau d, and RICO
violat ions.”145 Cybersell FL res ponded  imm edia te ly by seek ing a
decla ra tory judgment  in  a  U.S.  dist rict court in Florida
regard ing use  of the “Cyb er se ll” m ark. Wh en  the d ecla ra tory
judgment wa s t r ansfe r red  to the Dis t r ict  Cou r t  of Arizon a  for
consol ida t ion  wit h Cyb er sell AZ’s pr evious ly filed act ion ,
Cyber sell  FL m oved to dis mis s for  lack  of persona l  ju r i sd ict ion .
The distr ict cour t gra nt ed th e motion  to dism iss a nd  Cyber sell
AZ filed a t imely a ppea l.146
The Nint h Circuit  foun d th at  because Cybers ell FL ha d
sim ply pos ted an  essent ia lly pa ss ive  web s it e, a nd h ad n ot
conducted commer cial act ivity over  the In ter net  wit h  Arizon a
residents, it wou ld be u nr eas ona ble t o hold th at  it h ad
pu rp osefully availed its elf of the ben efit s a nd p rotect ion s of
Ar izon a’s laws.147 Cybersell FL had done  not hin g to en coura ge
people in Arizona to access it s w eb si t e, h ad e n ter ed  in to no
con t ract s in  Ar iz on a ,  a nd had m ade  no sa les  in  Arizon a .148 It
thus deemed Cyber sell FL’s cont acts wit h Arizona ins ufficient
to est ab lish  pu rp oseful a vai l m en t  and  decl ined to a s ser t
ju r isdict ion  over  it  in  Arizon a .149
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150. S ee Com pu Se rv e, I nc.  v. P at te rs on , 89  F. 3d  125 7, 1 263  (6t h C ir . 19 96).
151. Id . at  126 4 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
152. Id . at  126 5 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
153. Id . at  126 4-65  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
3. Combinin g the teachings of CompuSer ve and  Cyber sell:
three underlying criteria
  At lea st  th ree  unde r lying cr it er ia  se em  to be  a t  the h ea r t  of
the cyber-ju ris diction  an alys es cond uct ed by t he Com puS erve
and Cybersell cour t s . Both decisions look t o wheth er a
defendan t  (a) acted deliberat ely and pu rposefully; (b) rea ched
out  t o or  t a rge t ed  the forum  stat e; and (c) maintained or
perp etu at ed the  con tact  w it h  the forum  stat e. Each of these
factors  wil l be addressed  in  tu rn .
a. Deliberate and  purposeful action by the defendant with in
the forum  state. Both  the  Com puS erve and Cybersell cou r t s
focused  heavily on the defendants’ levels of awareness and
in ten t . Several words are pervasive in both opinions:
delibe ra te ly, consciously, pu rp osefully, in t e ntion ally, a nd
kn owingly.  The  ra tion ale be hin d focusing  on  one ’s  s t at e of mind
seem s to be t ha t t he m ore cognizan t a  defen da nt  is of its
connect ion  with the forum  stat e, the less surpr ised it sh ould be
if haled int o court  th ere. 150
Com puS erve poin t s ou t  tha t  Pa t t e r son  “chose t o t r ansmit
h i s softwa re from  Texa s t o Compu Ser ve’s sys te m in  Oh io,”151
“deliberately set  in m otion a n on going ma rk etin g rela tion sh ip
with  CompuSer ve,”152 and “purposefully tr an sa cted b us ines s in
Oh io.”153 In  con t ras t , the  de fendan t  in Cybersell made
abs olut ely no knowing effor t  to ta rget  Arizona . Cybers ell FL d id
not  i nt end t o tar get res ident s of Arizona  an y more th an
residen ts of any other  sta te.
These obser vations r eveal th at  cour ts a ddr essing cyber-
ju r isdict ion  cases s h ou ld carefully examine the defendant ’s
level of cognizan ce. The fun da men ta l ques tion  to be a ns wer ed is
whet her  th e defen da nt  kn ew or in ten ded t ha t h is a ctions  would
creat e a s ignifican t conn ection  wit h a  pa rt icula r foru m, a s
opposed to any  other  forum.  Conscious  and  purposefu l  act ions
by a defendant  toward a part icular forum  cut str ongly in  favor
of exercising persona l jurisdiction th ere.
b. Reach ing out to or targeting a particu lar forum  by
originatin g contacts with it. Perhaps  the e lement  of purposefu l
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154. By incurrin g these kin ds of contacts, th e CompuServe cou r t  noted ,
“Patt erson del iber at ely s et  in m otion  an  ong oing ma rk etin g rela tions hip wit h
CompuServe,  and h e should have r easonably foreseen tha t doing so would  ha ve
consequences in Oh io.” Com puS erve, 89  F .3d  a t 1265.
155. 480 U.S. 10 2 (1987). 
156. S ee id. at  106. 
157. S ee id . at 106, 112.
158. S ee id . at 105-06.
159. S ee id . at 116.
160. “The strea m of commerce th eory is merely a type of sp ecifi c juris diction .”
Smi th  v. H obby  Lob by S tor es , In c., 9 68 F . Su pp . 13 56,  136 2 (W. D. Ar k.  199 7).
ava ilment  most  rea di ly obse rva ble  by cou r ts  is  the actua l
reach ing ou t  to or  t a rget ing of a  forum by t he  de fendan t .
En te r ing in to con t ract s,  su bs cr ibing t o on-lin e s er vices,  or
t ransact ing business over t he In ter net  ar e all prim e examp les
of th is. Th e ut ility of th ese p hys ical  acts  is t ha t t he y can  ser ve
as warning signs—both t o defendant s and to cour t s—tha t  the
specter of jurisdiction has been ra ised.154
(1) J ustice O’Connor’s “add itional  conduct” fa ctor s f rom
Asahi. The act s  of “reach i n g ou t” which  both  Com puS erve and
Cybersell focused on closely resem ble the fa ct or s a rt iculat ed in
Jus t i ce O’Con n or ’s plura lit y opin ion  from Asahi v . Su perior
Court of California.155 In  Asahi,  t he Supreme Cour t ’s  landmark
case discussing t he st rea m of commer ce doctrine for per sona l
ju r isdict ion , a J ap an ese m an ufa ctu rer  of tire t ube  valves  sold
its  product t o a Taiwan ese tir e ma nu factur er. 156 The t i re
ma nu factur er  su bs equen t ly p la ced  t h is  p roduct  in  the “s t ream
of comm erce” by selling its tires  on th e worldwide ma rk et. 157 A
product  liabilit y su it ba sed on  th e alle gedly d efective tir e tu be
va lve  wa s fi led  in  a  Ca lifor n ia  st a te cou r t .158
A s h a rply divided United States Supreme Court held tha t
the exer cise of juris diction  by th e Californ ia court over t he
Ja panese va lve manufa ct u rer  would be unr easona ble and
unfa i r.159 Mar ked disa greemen t existed  over the pr oper
int erp ret at ion of the  st ream of comm erce t heor y un der lying th i s
de cis ion .160 Of t he t h ree  opin ion s h ande d d own , t he p osi t ion
ar ticulat ed in  J ust ice O ’Con nor’s p lu ra l ity  op in ion  was the most
rest rictive.
J oined on  t h is point by only three other J ustices, she
concluded tha t  “a defenda nt ’s a wa ren es s t ha t  the s t rea m of
commer ce may or  will sweep the product into the forum  State
does not  convert  th e me re a ct of placing t he p rodu ct in to the
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161. Asah i, 480 U.S. at 112.
162. Id .
163. S ee generally Gwenn  M. Kalow, From th e Internet to Court: Exercising
J ur isd icti on  over Wor ld  Wid e Web C om m un icat ion s, 65 F O R D H A M  L. RE V. 2241, 2269-
74 (1997) (arguin g t h a t  J u s t ice O’Connor’s stream  of commer ce theory sh ould be
applied to the Internet); David L. Stott , Com ment , Personal Ju risdiction in
Cyb ersp ace: The Constitutional Boun dary of Minimum  Contacts Limited to a Web Site,
15 J . MARSHALL J . COMPUTER AND IN F O . L. 819, 838 -44 (1 997 ) (an al ogizi ng  J us ti ce
O’Connor ’s “s t r eam of  commerce” theory  to the  In te rne t ).
164. S ee Cybers ell, Inc. v . Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir . 19 97);
CompuServe,  In c. v. P at te rs on , 89  F. 3d  125 7, 1 265 -67 (6 th  Cir . 19 96).
165. CompuServe, 89 F .3d  at  126 6 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
166. Id . at 1264.
167. S ee id . ( no t ing  tha t  “Pa t t e r son  adve r t is ed and  sold his  produ ct th rough
[CompuServe’s] syst em”). 
168. S ee id . ( no t ing  tha t  “myr ia d  ot h ers ga ined a ccess to Pa tt ers on’s softwa re via
s t ream into an act purposefully directed t ow a rd  the forum
St at e.”161 J ust ice O’Connor su ggested t ha t some additional
activity, above and beyon d m er ely  pu t t in g somet h in g in to the
s t ream of comm erce, should be requ ired  in order  to sa t is fy  due
process requ i rements . Such  ad d it ional acts would include
“design ing the  product  for  the forum s ta te,  es tabl ish ing
chann els for  p rov id ing  cus tomer  adv ice  in  the  forum s ta te,  and
ad ver tis ing,  m a rket ing, a nd  dist rib ut ing in  th e foru m s ta te .”162
In  esse nce, ea ch of the se elem ent s goes t o ta rget ing or s ingling
ou t  a  pa r t icu l ar  forum.
(2) Applyin g Ju stice O’Connor’s “additional condu ct”
factors in  Comp uS er ve and  Cyber sell . These  factors  serve as
excellent  cr i te r ia  for  gauging pu rposefu l  ava i lmen t  in
cyberspace. In de ed , bot h  Com puS erve and Cybersell bas ed t heir
cybe r -ju r isdict ion  analyses on J ustice O’Connor’s Asahi s t r eam
of comm erce t h eory,163 and m ore s pe cifica lly , on  her  “ad di t ion a l
conduct” factors.164
The Com pu S erv e cour t  poin ted ou t  that  “Pat terson
consciously rea ched  out from Texa s t o Ohio to subs cribe to
Comp uS er ve . . . .”165 Subsequen t ly “he  en te red  in to the
Shareware Regist ra tion  Agreem ent  whe n h e loaded  his
softwa r e ” onto CompuSer ve’s system .166 Although there is no
evide nce th at  Pa tt erson sp ecifically designed  h i s p roduct  for  the
Ohio mar ket , he clearly used  CompuServe to advertise th ere. 167
And while he m ay not h ave express ly establish ed independen t
channe ls for pr oviding ad vice to customer s in Oh io, he cert ain ly
use d Compu Se rve a s h is  market er  and d is t r ibu tor .168
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[CompuServe’s] sys te m”); see also id.  a t  1265 (observ ing  tha t  “CompuSe rv e, in  effect ,
acted as P at ter son’s distr ibut or, al beit e lectr onically a nd n ot ph ysically”). 
169. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at  419.
170. Id . 
171. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at  1266.
172. Id . at 1265.
173. Id .
In  cont ra s t , t he defen da nt  in Cybersell r eached ou t  t o
Arizon a  only in the sa me way th at  it rea ched out t o every oth er
st at e—mer ely by post ing a  home pa ge on th e Intern et. “It
ent ered  in to no con t ract s  in  Ar izona ,  made  no sa les  in  Ar izon a ,
received no tele ph one ca lls  from Arizon a , ea rned  no income
from Ar izona ,  and  sen t  no messages over  t he  In t e rnet  t o
Arizona .”169 The Cybersell defendan t committ ed none of the a ct s
listed  by Justice O ‘Connor. It  did not design its pr od u ct  for
Ar izon a , did n ot sp ecifically advertise in Arizona, had no
channe ls for pr ovidin g cu stomer advice in Arizona, and m ade
no effor t  to market  it s p rodu ct  th rough  a  dist r ibu tor  in  Arizon a .
As th e  N in th  Cir cu it  sa gely con clu de d,  “[T]her e is  no qu es t ion
tha t  an yone, anywher e cou ld access tha t  home page and
t h ereby lea rn  abou t  the s er vices offe red , we  cannot  se e  h ow
from th at  fact a lone it  can  be infer red  th at  Cyber sell F L
deliber at ely directed it s m er chandising effor t s t owa rd Ar izon a
re side nt s.”170
c. Mainta in ing and  perpetuating th e contacts in the forum
state. Another  crit eria  upon  which  Com puS erve and Cybersell
relied was t he con t inu ity of th e conta cts. By a ffirma tively
con t inu ing its contacts with a forum, a defendant ’s awareness
of the p oss ibi lit y of be in g h a led  in to tha t  p a r t icu la r  forum
should increas e. These continu ed acts m ay be Int ern et r ela t ed,
such  as repea tedly tr an smit ting softwar e files over the
Intern et, or non-Internet related, such  as sen din g regu lar  ma il,
placing phone calls, or ma king visits.
The Compu S erve court  focused on whether P att erson
“originat ed an d m ain ta ined ” conta cts wit h Oh io.171 I t  found  tha t
Pat terson had repeatedly perpetua ted the  con tacts in  va r ious
ways, a n d  t ha t  h is  soft wa re was con t in ua lly  adver t ised  on the
Comp uS er ve syst em . F ir st , “Pa t t er son  fr equen tly cont acted
Ohio to sell his compu ter  softwa re over Comp uS erve ’s Oh io
based  syst em .”172 Second, “Pat terson repeatedly sent his ‘goods’
to Compu Ser ve in Oh io for t heir  u ltim at e sa le.”173 Third,
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174. Id . at  126 4 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
175. Id . at 1265.
176. S ee id. at 1264.
177. Id . at 12 66. Afte r d iscov er in g Com pu Se rv e’s comp et in g soft wa re  wh ich  he
felt un law full y in frin ged  on h is own  pr odu cts , Pa tt er son  “rep ea te dly s en t b oth
electr onic an d r egu lar  ma il m ess age s t o Com pu Ser ve a bou t h is  claim, and h e posted
a  me ss ag e on  one  of Com pu Se rv e’s ele ctr oni c foru ms , wh ich  outlined h is case against
Compu Ser ve for anyone who wished to read it.” Patt erson “deman ded at  least
$100,000 to set tle t he m at ter .” Id .
Pat terson “purposefu l ly  perpetuated th e relat ionsh ip wit h
Comp uS er ve via repeated commu nications”174 in  a  way tha t  was
“inten ded to be ongoing in  na tu re; it  was  not  a  ‘one-shot
affair .’”175 An  examina t ion  of Cybersell r evea ls  a  ve ry differen t
s itua t ion . Cyber sell  FL  took  no act ion  to per pet ua te or  ma int ain
it s con nect ion  wit h  Arizon a .
Among the  act s  of perpetua t ion  w h ich  a cour t s hou ld look
for  a re t hose  su r rounding t he fil in g of the  a ctua l l aw  su i t.176 In
Com puS erve, for  instance , Pa t t e r son  “in it i ated  the  even t s  tha t
led to the filing of this suit b y ma kin g dem an ds of Comp uS er ve
via  ele ct ronic and  re gula r m ail m ess age s.”177 In  Cybersell,
however, defendan t Cybers ell FL appa ren t ly  made  no such
in it i at ion  sin ce it was in a  defensive position; it sim ply filed a
decla ra tory judgmen t  act ion  in  res pon se  to Cyb er se ll AZ’s
claim . Bas ed on t he cour ts ’ an alys es, it  seems  r easonab le  to
conclude tha t  a ct s sh owing a  fur th er an ce of cont act s by a
defendan t  increase th e lik elihood t ha t  the exer cise of
jurisdiction is ap propria te.
B. Designing a Framework Which Ana lyzes Both a
Defend ant’s Internet and  Non-In ternet Contacts: Cyber sell’s
Recomm ended S tructural Approach
 Weber provides th ree  cla ss ifica t ion s in to wh ich  defendan t s
can  be placed for  purposes of dete rmin ing persona l  ju r i sd ict ion .
Not wit hs ta nd ing,  it  fails to provide any subs tan t ive  gu idance
on how a court should decide in to which  of the  th ree  classes the
defendan t s sh ou ld be placed. More part icularly, it  fails to
provide ins t ruct ion  on  how non-In t erne t  con ta cts should be
factored int o its p ar ad igm. Cybersell sh ines  some in s t ruct ive
light on th is issue.
Cybersell recognized tha t t he pr oper an alysis in cyber-
ju r isdict ion  cases  sh ould  focus on  the “br oad s pe ct rum of
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178. Cybers ell, Inc. v. Cybe rse ll, Inc., 130  F.3d  414, 417 (9t h Cir . 1997). 
179. S ee CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260-61.
Int ern et  use on  the  one  hand,  and  con t a ct s  wi th the  forum on
the othe r .”178 In  pr act ical te rm s t his  mea ns  th at  whe n a  court  is
exam inin g the th ree  unde r lying cr it er ia  de r ived fr om
Com puS erve and Cybersell, it  shou ld look  not  on ly a t  the
Int ern et  conta cts in volved, but  also at  th e non-Int ern et
conta cts.
1. Internet contacts—what exactly did the defendan t do on the
Internet?
 In  exam inin g a d efend an t’s activit y involvin g th e In t erne t  a
cour t  should m ak e bot h a  qua lita tive  an d a  qua nt ita tive
ana lysis.
a. Qualitative analysis. The qu alita tive an alysis will be
twofold. Firs t, it will look at  th e interactivity of the con tact s
(t h e degree of inter action) and  second, it will probe th e natu re
of th e con tacts (t he t ype or  kind of m ater ia l in volve d).
(1) Interactivity. In te ra ctivit y is m ea su re d a long a
spect rum. On  the one  end ar e conta cts wh ich ar e complet ely
pa ssive  in  na ture , such  as  an  in for m a t iona l we b p age or
adve r t is emen t . In ter act ion is lim ited  to sim ply re ad ing the
mate r ia l on su ch a  sit e. The se In ter net  sit e s t ypically provide
informat ion about a  club, organ ization, family, or business .
On th e ot h e r  end of the sp ectru m a re In ter net  activities
wh ich  involve substa nt ial int era ction. In such in sta nces, user s
may sign  up for  a  pa r t icu la r  se rvice , m ake a  pu rchas e, or  ent er
in to a  b ind ing  con t ract .  In  between  t h e passive  and subs tan t ia l
in te ract ion  ext rem it ies  lie  a  br oad ra nge of point s wh ich involve
some de gr ee  of in ter act ion  r anging from minima l t o s igni fi can t .
Fr equ en tly,  th ese in te ra ctions  involve a  us er  sign alin g an
in dica t ion  of inte re st  in be ing p laced  on a  ma iling l ist or
receivin g some other  type of informa tion or ser vice—either by
phone,  E-m ail, or r egula r m ail. Th is is d one sim ply by en ter ing
a  name, p hone n umber , a dd res s (E -mail or  regu la r ), a nd s ome
informa tion about t he user’s interests.
In  Com pu S erv e, th e level of int er act ion wa s ext re me ly high .
Pat terson en tered in to a  cont r a ct  over  the  In te rnet  and  then
used  th e Int ern et t o tra nsm it comput er files to Com p u Se r ve.179
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180. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at  419.
181. S ee CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260.
182. S ee id . at 1261.
183. Id . at 1260.
The two par t ie s  cor responded  back and for th  to a  s ign ifi can t
degree. In  con t ras t , the  pa r t i es  in  Cybersel l essen t ia lly had  no
in te ract ion  over  t he  In t e rnet .  “Th e int er act ivit y of [the
Cybersell FL] web pa ge [was ] limite d t o receiving the  browse r ’s
name an d add res s  a n d  a n  ind icat ion of int er est  . . . .”180 I t  was
not  possible t o sign u p for an y kin d of se rv ices , make  any
purchases, or enter int o any contracts.
(2) N atu re of int eraction. Th e pr ima ry focus when
exam inin g the  na tu re of the  in te ract ion  is th e exte nt  to wh ich
the conta ct is com m ercial in  na ture. T he bot tom-lin e ques t ion
he re i s qu it e pla in : Is  money in volved  in  the in ter act ion ? As
with  in t e ractivity, th e na tu re of the int era ction may be viewed
a lon g a cont inu um . On on e en d a re cont act s in  which  abs olut ely
no mon ey is in volved. Exa mp les of th is t ype of cont act  would
include sendin g an ordin ar y E-mail, viewing  an  adver t isement
or  other  in form a t ion  pos ted  on an  ele ct ronic bu lle t in  boa rd,  or
sim ply visiti ng a  pa ss ive  web page.  On  the oppos it e end of t he
spect rum fa ll con tact s w hich  di rect ly involve  the t r ansfe r  of
mon ey. Signing up  for or offering ser vices in volving a cha rge,
purchas ing an  it em, and  en te r ing into con t r act s  r el a ted to
money are examples of this ex t remi ty.  The  na tu re of such
conta cts is primarily business.
In  Com pu S erv e, t he na ture of in ter act ion  between  Pa t t er son
and CompuSer ve was fun dam ent ally one of busin ess.
Comp uS er ve served as a distributor for Patterson ’s software
products. The t wo par t ie s  en tered in to a  con t ract  over  the
Int ern et  which  set  forth  th e wa y in which  th is r elat ionsh ip
would  opera t e .181 Patt erson subsequently tra nsmitted t hir ty -
two ma ster  softwar e files to CompuS erve.182 Patt erson
adver tised  his softwar e on th e CompuSer ve system . Subscribers
to CompuServe would dow n loa d software and  then  “pay the
crea tor ’s su ggest ed licen s in g fee if she use[d] the software
beyon d a s pecified t ria l per iod.”183 The subscr ibe r  pa id the fee
dir ectly to Com pu Ser ve in O hio, a nd  “CompuServe t [ook] a 15%
fee for  it s t rouble  before r em it t in g t he ba la nce t o the sha reware
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185. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at  419.
186. Id . 
187. S ee Bur ger Kin g Corp. v. Rud zewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (quot ing
Trave le r s Hea lth  Ass’n v. Virginia , 339 U.S . 643, 647 (1950 )). 
188. While  the  commiss ion  of  even  a  single act  can  su ppor t ju ri sdi ction , so lon g
as it creates a  “substantia l connection” with the forum, th e l ikelih ood t ha t ju ri sdi ction
can  be susta ined should increase a s the n um ber  of cont acts  mu ltiplie s. S ee McGee v.
In te rna t iona l Life In s. Co., 355 U .S. 220, 223 (1957). A defendan t who has  enter ed
in to only one contract shou l d n o t  be t hr own  int o th e sa me  clas s a s on e wh o ha s
con t r act ed hun dreds or th ousands of times with pa rties in t he forum st ate.
189. Compu S erve, 89 F.3d at  1265 (quoting LAK, Inc. v. Deer Cre ek En ters ., 885
F.2d 1293, 130 1 (6th  Cir. 19 89), cert . d eni ed , 494 U.S. 1056 (1990)). Th e a ccur acy of
th is st at em en t i s b eli ed  by t he  re as on in g of t he  Com puServe court  itself. While
o st ensibly  c la iming  tha t  t he quan t ity  of  the  con tac t s i s no t  wha t  de te rmines
jur isd icti on,  th e cou rt  pr oceed s t o focus  he avi ly on  Pa t t e r s on ’s ha ving “frequently
con tact ed Ohio,” “repeatedly sen t” his goods, “perpetuat ed ” and “main tained” these
con tact s , and  crea t ed an  “ongoing ma rk etin g rela tions hip” with  Compu Ser ve. Id. a t
1264-66 (emph asis a dded). If th e frequ ency or du ra tion of conta cts is n ot given we ight
in  the jurisdictional equation, why is the court fixing its aim on precisely this aspect
crea tor .”184 Thus,  the na tu re  of the  in ter a ct ion here was
primarily business.
In  Cybersell, however, t he in ter act ion m ore closely
resem bled a p as sive web sit e wh ich in volved no m oney.
Cybers ell FL p ost ed  an  “ess en t ia lly  pa ss ive  home p age on  the
web.”185 Because  no “mon ey ch anged hands on  the  In t e rnet”
between  the two parties, Cybersell FL “conducted no
comme rcia l act ivity over  th e In te rn et  in Ar izona .”186
b. Quantitative analysis. Logica lly , t he d egr ee  to wh ich  a
defendan t  has p urpos efu lly  ava ile d i t se lf of t he be nefit s of t he
laws of a  s t ate should de pe nd t o som e ext en t  on  the n umber  of
con tact s it  has m ade  wit h  res iden t s of t ha t  st a te. B oth  the
fr e qu e n cy of t he  con tact s , a s  we ll  as  t he du ra t ion  of t hem,
should be  factored  in to the ju r isdict ion a l equat ion: How often
were  th e cont act s occurr ing, a nd over w hat length of tim e were
t h ey ma de? Were th e cont acts sp oradic an d inconsisten t , or
con t inuous  and  systemat ic? By not ing th e import an ce of hav ing
“contin uin g relationships and obligations” in  order  to sa t is fy  the
purposefu l ava ilment  requ ir e men t ,187 t he  Supreme  Cour t
indicated  th at  th e quantity  of con tact s  is  indeed a  factor  in  the
ju r isdict ion a l equa t ion .188 Not wit hs ta nd ing t his , howeve r, t he
Sixt h  Cir cu i t in Com puS erve un equ ivocally st at ed, “ ‘I t  is  the
qua li t y of [th e] conta cts,’ a nd  not  the ir  number  or  s t a tus , tha t
det er min es wh et he r t he y am oun t t o pur posefu l ava ilme nt .”189
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of the contacts? This kind of internal inconsisten cy da ma ges  th e cr ed ibi lit y of t he
CompuServe analysis. It is misleading and confusing not to simply acknowledge the
need  to examine the qua ntity of contacts involved.
Because Web er r e li es  on  CompuServe, it exhibits t his s am e pr oblem. Web er stat es
tha t  it  focu se s on  th e qu al it y a nd  na tu re  of th e conta cts, m akin g absolu tely n o
me nt ion  of th e qu an tit y. In  spi te  of th is, a  close r  a naly sis  sh ows t ha t t he  cour t
actu ally gives wei ght  to qu an tit at ive as  well as  qua lita tive con sider at ions. The cour t
stat ed tha t  it  wou ld con sid er  wh et he r a  defe nd an t h ad  en te re d in to con tr act s
invo lv ing the “knowing and repeated” transm ission of comput e r  files. S ee Weber  v.
Jolly  Hot els , 977  F. S up p. 32 7, 33 3 (D.N .J . 199 7). By focu sin g on t h e  n u mber of times
the defendan t ha d sent  files over th e Int erne t, th e court un wit t i n gly acknowledges
the need for some type of a quantitative analysis.
2. Non-Internet contacts—What exactly did the defendan t do
in addition to making contacts via the Internet?
 The portion of the an alysis which examines the  non-Int ern et
con t a ct s be tween  the p ar t ies i s r ela t ive ly s t ra igh t forwa rd.  As
with  the an alysis for  th e In ter net  conta cts, a  court  sh ould
conduct  bot h  a  qualitat ive and a  quant itative analysis. In
looking for  pu rposefu l  ava i lmen t  in  t h is  con text  t he  t r adi t iona l
purposeful ava ilm en t  ana lys is  out lin ed  by t he S upr em e Cour t
shou ld be u sed . The qua lit a t ive  ana lys is  typ ica lly  wil l focu s on
con tact s su ch a s ph one calls , lett ers  sen t via  regula r m ail,
adve r t is emen t s in  forum pu bli ca t ion s,  con t r a ct s  wi th r e siden t s
(signed on  pape r , not  over  t he In ter net ), and  per sona l visits
made to the forum  stat e for meetings and negotiations.
The qua nt itat ive ana lysis of th e defe n dan t ’s  con tact s  wi th
the forum st a te s hould  en ta il looki ng a t  bot h  the frequ en cy an d
dura t ion  of the cont act s in volved. With  regard  to frequency , the
cour t  would  look t o wheth er  th e defen da nt  ma de cont act s da ily,
or  wheth er th ey wer e more spora dic, such as once or twice over
a  per iod  of five  yea rs.  In  look in g a t  du ra t ion , t he cou r t  w ou ld
exam ine  whet her  th e cont acts ext ended  over  a  pe r iod  of days or
weeks, or  whether  they  t ransp ired over  a  longer per iod  such  as
several years.
3. Assem bl in g the “bolst ered ” Weber  m odel
 The componen t s necessa ry to bolster  th e Weber m odel a r e
now ready  to be incorpora ted. The y inclu de t he  su bst an tive
Cybersell fr amework , t he  three Com pu S erve/ Cybersell crit eria ,
and the r ela ted nes s a nd r ea son able nes s p or t ion s of t he
min imum con tact s test . Once Weber’s t h ree-t ier ed  cla ss ifica t ion
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ S H U R - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1704 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
190. S ee, e.g., Mayewsk i, su pr a n ote  129,  at  327 (ca llin g for “fur th er  exp an sion
of the p er mis sib le  scop e o f per son a l ju r is di ct ion” in cyber space , and  favor ing the
exercise of jurisdiction  over en tit ie s  t h a t  me re ly “sol icit  bu sin es s t hr ou gh  a W eb s it e”);
Howard B. Str avit z, Pers on al  J uri sd ic tion  in  Cy bers pa ce: S o m e th i n g Mor e is R equ ired
on  th e El ectr oni c S tr eam  of Com m erce, 49 S.C. L. RE V. 925, 940 (1998) (“Any Intern et
con tact , except perhaps a  passive web site, should be sufficient t o p a s s m u ster u nder
the mi ni mu m c on ta cts  br an ch. ”).
scheme is assimilated with th ese components, the “bolstered”
Weber model is rea dy for u se. Em ploying th is revam ped model
is fairly straightforward.
In  an y given case, a court  would first look at  th e specific
con tact s of a  defendan t  in  th e foru m b y us ing t he  above
Cybersell fram ework. This will involve examin ing th e Int ern et
and non-In terne t  con tact s  from both  a  qua l it a t ive  and
qu an tit at ive persp ective. Part icular focus will be made on  the
t h ree unde r lying cr it er ia  de r ived fr om Com puS erve a nd
Cybersell: (1) deliberat e an d pur poseful action in th e forum , (2)
r each ing  ou t  t o or targeting the forum, and (3) main ta in ing and
pe rpe tua t in g con tact s in  the for um.
T h is de ta ile d,  fact -se nsi t ive  analys is  wil l gu ide a  cour t  in
dete rmin ing into which of the th ree Weber cla ss ifica t ion s a
defendan t  properly sh ould be p la ced. On ce a defen da nt  is
placed in  the Weber s chem e, t he m ode l a nsw er s t he ques t ion  of
purposefu l availm ent . The fin a l  st ep  i s to round  ou t  the
ju r isdict ion a l ana lys is  by a dd res sing t he s econd  and th ird
prongs of the  min imum contact s  t es t—re la tedness  and
reasonableness. Only wh en a ll th ree  pr ongs of th e min imu m
con tact s test  ar e sat isfied is  the exer cise of pe r son a l ju r isdict ion
app ropria te.
C. The “Bolstered” Weber  Model
 F rom bot h  the cou r tr oom floor a nd a cadem ia  have come
cla mors for  an  expans ion  of persona l  ju r isdict ion int o
cyberspace.190 While the ea rly tr end  in  the fed er a l cir cu it  cour t s
has been  to withs tand th i s si r en  ca ll w it h  a  t em pe red  app roach
t o cybe r -ju r isdict ion , m any lower  cour t s a cross  the cou nt ry a re
st ill st ruggl in g. The d ispa ra te d ecis ion s of th e lower  cour t s
demons t ra te tha t  the gu idance p rovid ed  thus fa r—wh ile  on the
righ t  tr ack—sim ply is n ot a dequ at e. In just ice will occur  if more
deta iled guida nce is n ot pr ovided, sin ce s om e lower court s are
op t ing to exercise jurisdict ion  in ca ses  wh er e defen da nt s h ave
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done little m or e  t h a n post a p ass ive web site on th e Int ern et.
T h e lines need t o be more clearly dra wn t o protect part ies who
choose  to use t he In ter net , but wh ose conduct does  not  r is e t o
the level of p urpos efu l a va ilm en t  se t  by t he S upr em e Cour t .
The revised and substa ntiated Weber model helps draw these
lines.
1. The bol stered  and  rev i sed  Weber  m odel is consistent with
In terna t iona l  Shoe and  progeny
 The greatest  benefit of the bolstered Weber model is, sim ply
pu t , t ha t  it  i s fa ir . It  res pe ct s t he p r in cip les  wh ich  the  Supreme
Cou r t  has a r t icu la ted  in  it s l en gt hy line of per son a l ju r isdict ion
cases. By incorpora ting t he t hr ee Com puS erve/ Cybersell
crit eria  i nto th e Int ern et/non-Int ern et fra mework  recommen ded
by Cybersell, a court  ha s a viable  tool  wi th which to deter mine a
defendan t ’s p roper  p lace in the  three-t i er ed Weber model. Wh ile
the definitions of th e th ree Weber class ifica t ions  a re perhaps
overly broa d wh en view ed in  isolat ion, th ey ar e sign ificant ly
clarified by the det ailed  cr it er ia  in  the beefed -up a na lyt ica l
framework. Those defendan ts  who a re  using the  In te rnet  and
other means to der ive  sign ifica n t  fin ancia l be nefit  from a
par t icu la r st at e will be h eld t o ha ve sa tis fied  t h e purposefu l
availm ent  req uir eme nt s. Th ose wh o mer ely ar e post ing
informat ion  on  the  In te rnet  will not improper ly be ya nked  from
the cyber-highway an d pus hed  thr ough the court room door  in a
foreign  ju r isdict ion .
2. Bolstered  Weber  is  su pp ort ed  by  pu bl ic p olicy
 Not  only is the modified Weber m od el  a  pra ctical t ool, but  it
is up held  by st ron g pu blic policy cons ider at ions a s well . One of
the dangers  of extending per sona l jur isdict ion too far  is tha t  the
poten t ia l lia bil it y of In ter net  us ers  will be sign ificant ly
increased. Some users essentially would be precluded from
us ing th e I n t er n et for comm er cial pu rp oses. Th ose opt ing t o
cont inue using t he In ter net  wou ld  be  forced  to pr otect
th ems elves by pur chasin g insur an ce, and th e cost of Inter net
use wou ld  conse qu en t ly r ise. I ncrea se d op er a t ion a l cost s
ultim at ely wou ld  dimin ish  the efficien cy a nd u t ilit y of the
In terne t . Because  of the enormous ca pa cit y for  in cr eased
economic an d social benefit t o be derived from the In ter net ,
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191. CompuServe, 89 F.3d a t  1262 (citing World -Wide Volkswagen  Corp. v.
Woods on,  444 U.S . 286, 297 (1980 )). 
publ ic policy str ongly supports  creat ing an  environm ent  in
which the Int ernet can develop and flourish.
The revised Weber schem e will en able  court s t o at ta in a
much  grea ter  degr ee of uniform ity in  th eir decisions. Fur th er,
the bolstered Weber’s par adigm p rovides fa i r warn ing to pa r t ie s
con templa t ing doing business over the  In te rnet  of wha t
“cond uct  will and  will n ot r en der  th em  liab le t o suit .”191 This
test  pr ovides m ore clear -cut gu idelin es for t hose d eciding
whet her  th e pot en tia l liab ility of conduct ing act ivi ty on  the
Int ern et  is out weighed by its benefits. Based on the t est’s
guideposts, poten t ia l u sers can  bett er gau ge the r isk t ha t t hey
will be haled in to cour t  in  a  fore ign  ju r i sd ict ion ,  and  the
cor responding level of intera ction they  a re willing to under ta ke.
By giving In ter net  use r s a  clea rer  idea  of w h at  type  of conduct
may ren der  th em s ubject  to su it in  a give n  ju r i sd ict ion ,  the
am ount  of litigation over cyber-jur isdiction will likely decrea se.
3. Bolstered  Weber’s  potential drawbacks
 Of course, the bolstered Weber’s classificat ion syst em is  not
without  i ts  imp erfect ions. In evita bly, “borde rlin e” cas es will
a rise wh ich  wil l be  di fficu lt  to cla ss ify.  Som e d et ractors m ay
object  that  it  is simply not possible to “pigeonhole” every
Int ern et case in to th e Weber fram ework. However, th ese ar e a l l
object ion s t ha t  could  simila r ly be r a ised  wit h  rega rd t o the
normal persona l jurisdiction fram ework un der International
Shoe. At the very least, bol stered Weber’s fram ework pr ovides
sign ificant ly g rea t er  fa i r n ess, p red icta bility, a nd  forewa rn ing
th an  would exist in its  absen ce.
VI. CO N C L U S I O N
 T h e t h r ee -t ier ed  m ode l p r opos ed by the Weber cour t  is
deficient  because it  does not ad equa tely add ress  all th ree
prongs of th e Supreme Cour t ’s  min imum con tact s  t es t .
Alth ough  th e Weber schem e does pr ovide help  in  address ing  the
first  and m ost  di fficu lt  pr ong of the t es t—pu rpos efu l
ava i lmen t—Weber fails to furnish adequate guidan ce on  the
specific types  of con tact s  tha t  compr ise  each  of th e t hr ee
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categories. The broad  classificat ions do not adequ at ely a llow
poten t ia l defendan t s  t o s t r u ctur e th eir p rim ar y cond uct  with
the req uis ite d egre e of assu ra nce a s t o wher e th ey will an d will
not  be r end ere d su bject t o suit .192
Fur ther , th e Weber class ifications  do not p rovide  su fficient ly
deta iled crit er ia to enable a court applying it to distinguish
between  th e differi ng types or  the  va ry ing  degrees of cyber-
conta cts. In  the end,  the nebu lous n at ur e of Weber’s th ree-
tiered  test  would a llow th e exer cise of jur isdict ion in  some cases
where a  de fen da nt ’s con du ct  had n ot  r isen  to the le vel  of
purposefu l availm ent . This would violate d ue pr ocess as  defined
by the Suprem e Court , and thu s makes t he Weber model
un acceptable. In  spit e of th ese s hor tcomin gs, h owever , th e
Weber mode l does  se rve a s a n  exce lle n t  framework upon  wh ich
to build. When t he Weber pa rad igm  is revised and
subst an tiat ed with s ome str uct ur e an d a ddit iona l crite ria , it
produces  un iform and  fa i r r esu lt s a nd  pr ovides a n ea sily
underst ood forewarning to Internet u sers.
The r evised Weber mode l ca n  be  a  t r em en dou s b oon to a
cour t  wrest ling with cyberspa ce conta cts. This  m odel com por t s
with  th e In ternat iona l Shoe due process fram ework. It also
complies  wit h a nd  expa nd s u pon t he  Sixt h a nd  N in t h  Circu it’s
Com puS erve and Cybersell decisions . If lower court s will a dopt
an  analysis like the bolstered Weber model , subs tan t ia l
un iformi ty an d consist ency will be a ch i eved  in  the ou tcomes  of
cybe rsp ace jur isdict ion  ca ses. Th e te chn ological an d fina ncia l
growth  of the I nt ern et w ill progr ess u nen cum ber ed by overly
br oad as ser tion s of juris dictiona l power . Litiga tion  als o will be
redu ced since potent ial litigant s will be more awar e of wha t
acts will subject th em t o jur isdiction in foreign a ren as.
Alth ough  th e bolstered  Weber  model appea rs pr acticable,
the rea lity is  t ha t  un t il  t he  Supreme Cour t a ddr esse s electr onic
commer ce on  the  Int ern et, some lower cour ts will cont inue t o
miss th e ma rk . The Sup rem e Cou r t  w ou ld do well to accept
ce r t iora r i on  a  cybe r -ju r isdict ion  case  in  t h e near  fu tu re  and
adopt a  ru le s im ila r  to the on e fr om Weber v. J olly Hotels in it s
modi fied  and b ols ter ed  form.
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 4\ F I N A L \ S H U R - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
1708 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
Ru ssell D. Shu rtz
